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When upon a point of ritual or of dedication or special worship a man talks to you of the 
Spirit and Intention, and complains of the dryness of the Word, look at him askance. He 
is not far removed from Heresy. 
 
—Hilaire Belloc 
 1 
Introduction 
 
My attention was drawn to topic of biblical inspiration and inerrancy in the thought of 
Joseph Ratzinger for two reasons.  First, it is timely.  In his recent Post-Synodal Apostolic 
Exhortation on the Word of God in the Life and Mission of the Church, Joseph Ratzinger—now 
as Pope Benedict XVI
1—calls upon theologians to renew their reflection on a topic long dear to 
him:   
Certainly theological reflection has always considered inspiration and truth as two key 
concepts for an ecclesial hermeneutic of the sacred Scriptures. Nonetheless, one must 
acknowledge the need today for a fuller and more adequate study of these realities, in 
order better to respond to the need to interpret the sacred texts in accordance with their 
nature. Here I would express my fervent hope that research in this field will progress and 
bear fruit both for biblical science and for the spiritual life of the faithful.
2
 
 
Benedict‟s mention of “need” and “fervent hope” in his treatment of biblical inspiration and 
inerrancy suggests that he does not consider these topics to have received scholarly attention 
commensurate with their importance.  Perhaps this explains why Ratzinger bestows only 
measured praise on the Pontifical Biblical Commission‟s Interpretation of the Bible in the 
Church,
3
 which dutifully affirms the inspiration and inerrancy of Scripture, but does not develop 
the meaning of these hallowed phrases.
4
     
                                                 
1
 This paper limits itself to the theology of Joseph Ratzinger.  This means basically that it excludes those works that 
seem to be the product of a committee and those that were promulgated in official capacity as Pope.  Works that are 
published in private capacity—even after his election as Pope—are included. 
2
 Benedict XVI, Verbum Domini (Boston: Pauline Books and Media, 2010), s. 19. 
3
 See Ratzinger‟s “Preface” to The Interpretation of the Bible in the Church; Dean P. Bechard, ed. The Scripture 
Documents: An Anthology of Official Catholic Teachings, trans. Dean P. Bechard (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical 
Press, 2002), 245.  There Ratzinger comments, “The Pontifical Biblical Commission, in its new form after the 
Second Vatican Council, is not an organ of the Teaching Office, but rather a commission of scholars who … take 
positions on important problems of scriptural interpretation and know that for this task they enjoy the confidence of 
the teaching office.”  Speaking of the authority of the same document, Ratzinger remarks that “the Holy Father with 
a carefully prepared address confirms the essential points [of The Interpretation of Scripture in the Life of the 
Church], thus assuming the essence of this text (as opposed to its details) into magisterial teaching.”  See Ratzinger, 
Modernità atea,” pp. 67-68; cited in Peter S. Williamson, Catholic Principles for Interpreting Scripture: A Study of 
the Pontifical Biblical Commission's the Interpretation of the Bible in the Church (Rome: Editrice Pontificio 
Instituto Biblico, 2001), 25. 
4
 See ibid., 34, where Williamson comments, “Although the IBC prescinds from presenting a theological treatise on 
Scripture, in the course of its exposition it repeatedly affirms traditional beliefs about Scripture, including its 
 2 
In recent years, Catholic theologians have begun to show themselves more willing to re-
engage these traditional terms.  Abbot Denis Farkasfalvy, OCSO, has published several articles
5
 
and a monograph
6
 on the matter.  Several contributors to the most recent issue of the journal 
Letter and Spirit vigorously defend a version of inspiration and inerrancy very similar to that 
proposed by the biblical encyclicals of the early twentieth century.
7
  Matthew Levering, who in 
this aforementioned issue laments contemporary neglect of the “once lively debate,”8 has himself 
contributed a contributed a scholarly reflection on the metaphysics of biblical interpretation.
9
   
Ratzinger‟s own contributions to the nature of the biblical text and its interpretation, moreover, 
have received not a little scholarly attention of late.
10
 
Second, it is pastoral.  The cultural conditioning of revelation has become a burning issue 
among Catholics sufficiently educated to enough to grapple with “historical consciousness.”  To 
what extent can we expect Scripture—a text that seems so thoroughly human, so thoroughly 
stamped by the human circumstances of its production—to convey to us a truth valid for all 
                                                                                                                                                             
inspiration (I.B.2.g; I.C.1.f; I.F.d; II.B.1.c), inerrancy (I.F.c), and the fact that Catholics recognize God as its 
„principal author‟ (II.B.3.c).” 
5
 Denis M. Farkasfalvy, "Inspiration and Interpretation," in Vatican II: Renewal within Tradition, ed. Matthew 
Levering and Matthew L. Lamb (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 77-100.; Denis M. 
Farkasfalvy, "How to Renew the Theology of Biblical Inspiration?" Nova Et Vetera 4, no. 2 (2006), 231-253.; Denis 
M. Farkasfalvy, "The Biblical Foundation for a Theology of Inspiration," Nova Et Vetera 4, no. 4 (2006), 719-745. 
6
 See Denis M. Farkasfalvy, Inspiration & Interpretation : A Theological Introduction to Sacred Scripture 
(Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2010). 
7
 See esp. Robert L. Fastiggi, "Communal Or Social Inspiration: A Catholic Critique," Letter and Spirit 6 (2010), 
247-263.; Brian W. Harrison, "Restricted Inerrancy and the 'Hermeneutic of Discontinuity'," Letter and Spirit 6 
(2010), 225-246. 
8
 For a brief treatment of this debate in Catholic circles, see Matthew Levering, "The Inspiration of Scripture: A 
Status Quaestionis," Letter and Spirit 6 (2010), 281-286. 
9
 Matthew Levering, Participatory Biblical Exegesis : A Theology of Biblical Interpretation (Notre Dame, Ind.: 
Notre Dame, Ind. : University of Notre Dame Press, 2008). 
10
 For good book-length treatments of treatment of Ratzinger‟s hermeneutics of faith, see especially Scott Hahn, 
Covenant and Communion : The Biblical Theology of Pope Benedict XVI (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Grand Rapids, 
Mich. : Brazos Press, 2009).; Dorothee Kaes, Theologie Im Anspruch Von Geschichte Und Wahrheit : Zur 
Hermeneutik Joseph Ratzingers (St. Ottilien: EOS Verlag, 1997), 261.  For chapter-length treatments, see also 
Tracey Rowland, Benedict XVI : A Guide for the Perplexed (London ; New York: T & T Clark, 2010), 48-70.; 
Thomas P. Rausch, Pope Benedict XVI : An Introduction to His Theological Vision (New York: Paulist Press, 2009), 
65-84.; Tracey Rowland, Ratzinger's Faith : The Theology of Pope Benedict XVI (Oxford ; New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2008), 48-66.     
 3 
ages?  If not every element of revelation is straightforwardly applicable to present circumstances; 
if, in short, scripture requires ongoing interpretation, how does one undertake this task without 
unduly subordinating Scripture to the limitations of our present perspective? 
Related to the matter of Scripture‟s historical transcendence is the question of doctrinal 
continuity across the Church‟s cultural epochs.  The period between Vatican Council I and 
Vatican Council II was marked by the Church‟s strong and repeated opposition to the admission 
of formal error in Scripture, and occasionally by official condemnations of certain exegetical 
positions.  Ratzinger himself admits that, during these years, magisterial authority undermined its 
credibility by yielding—at least on occasion—to “narrow-minded and petty surveillance.”11  He 
also admits quite candidly that  
there are magisterial decisions which cannot be the final word on a given matter as such 
but, despite the permanent value of their principles, are chiefly also a signal for pastoral 
prudence, a sort of provision policy.  Their kernel remains valid, but the particulars 
determined by circumstances can stand in need of correction.  In this connection, one will 
probably call to mind both the pontifical statements of the last century regarding freedom 
of religion and the anti-Modernist decisions of this century, especially the decisions of 
the then Biblical Commission.
12
 
 
What are the permanent “principles” and valid “kernel” of the Church‟s recent teaching on 
Scriptural interpretation?   
If Ratzinger still holds the kernel of the Biblical Commission‟s decisions to be valid, then 
it seems safe to say that he would feel obliged by the “core” teachings of the biblical encyclicals 
as well.
13
  But where does the “kernel” end and where do the  “particulars determined  by 
                                                 
11
 Joseph Ratzinger, The Nature and Mission of Theology : Essays to Orient Theology in Today's Debates (San 
Francisco; San Francisco, Calif.: San Francisco : Ignatius Press, 1995), 66. 
12
 ibid., 106. 
13
 Even in the heyday of exegetical surveillance by the PBC, it was uncertain whether its responsa—many of which 
sought to settle questions of composition, authorship, dating and the like—were matters of “truth” (veritas) or 
“security” (veritas).  On the strength of statements such as the one cited above, Bechard argues that Razinger reads 
the responsa as having always been about “security” (Bechard, The Scripture Documents: An Anthology of Official 
Catholic Teachings, 328 fn38).  For an illuminating discussion of the responsa of the PBC in general, see ibid., esp. 
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circumstances” begin?  Ratzinger answers this question only indirectly, that is, by developing his 
own theory of inspiration and inerrancy.  Given Ratzinger‟s ecclesial stature and unimpeachable 
reputation for doctrinal orthodoxy, such a study necessarily has implications for the correct 
interpretation of doctrine as well—especially for the doctrine formulated during the period 
between the Vatican Councils.   
Though this question of doctrinal interpretation is not the main concern of this largely 
descriptive thesis, it does partially explain the structure of the whole.  The first chapter of the 
thesis presents background information essential to understanding how Ratzinger stands vis-à-vis 
the major theological debates of the twentieth century on the subject of inspiration and inerrancy.  
We have chosen to explore three of the more important Catholic expositors of inspiration and 
inerrancy writing before the close of the Council: P. Benoit, OP, K. Rahner, SJ, and N. Lohfink, 
SJ.  This chapter will also reference relevant documents of the Church‟s magisterium, especially 
the biblical encyclicals promulgated between the First and Second Vatican Councils.   
In the second chapter we will examine Ratzinger‟s “traditionary” theology of inspiration, 
on the basis of which we conclude that Ratzinger‟s thought resembles Rahner‟s more than 
Benoit‟s.  However, will also draw attention to the subtle differences in theological sensibility 
that a close reading of both Ratzinger and Rahner uncover. 
In the third chapter, will examine Ratzinger‟s “traditionary” model of inerrancy.  Here 
again, we note Ratzinger‟s greater affinity for Lohfink‟s model of inerrancy than for Benoit‟s.  
Nonetheless, we also show how Ratzinger incorporates elements of both models by reimagining 
and “complexifying” the intending subject of Scripture.  By casting the Church in the role of 
Scripture‟s third intending subject (in addition God and the human authors), Ratzinger provides a 
                                                                                                                                                             
318-322.  No such doubt seems to have cast on the teachings of the biblical encyclicals, which therefore still deserve 
deference from contemporary theologians. 
 5 
richer metaphysical rationale both for reading Scripture as a canonical whole and for using 
ecclesial faith to circumscribe the truth that Scripture properly intends to affirm. 
We will conclude with by revisiting Ratzinger‟s theology of inspiration and inerrancy 
from the perspective of continuity of doctrine. 
 6 
Chapter 1 
 
Background to Ratzinger’s Theology of Inspiration and Inerrancy 
 
In order better to situate Ratzinger‟s contribution to the theology of inspiration and inerrancy, 
some background will prove useful.  Toward that end, this essay will attempt to present 
succinctly two theories of inspiration, along with their corresponding theories of inerrancy, 
influential before the Second Vatican Council.  The first, most ably defended by the Dominican 
P. Benoit and largely assumed into the preconciliar biblical enyclicals, can be broadly 
characterized as the Thomist-prophetic-instrumental model.  The second, proposed by the Jesuit 
Karl Rahner and further elaborated by the Jesuit exegete Norbert Lohfink, can be broadly 
characterized as Molinist-ecclesial-predefinitive.  Since each typology will receive fuller 
treatment below, it suffices for now to explain that the first category designates a theological 
“muse,” the second a primary function for the sacred writer, and the third a model of divine-
human interaction.  
 The argument will proceed in four stages.  First, we will introduce the Thomist model of 
inspiration as Benoit presents it.  However, since the Thomist model and the magisterial teaching 
seemed to develop in tandem, Benoit‟s personal theology and the Magisterium‟s official 
theology will often be presented alongside each other.  With respect to magisterial theology, we 
will draw chiefly from the biblical encyclicals promulgated between the two Vatican Councils: 
Providentissimus Deus (1893) of Leo XIII, Pascendi Gregis Domini (1907) of Pius X, Spiritus 
Paraclitus (1920) of Benedict XV, Divino Afflante Spiritu (1943) of Pius XII.  Second, we will 
study the understanding biblical inerrancy flowing from the Thomist model of inspiration.  Here, 
again, we will present Benoit‟s personal theology and magisterial instruction together so as to 
suggest the close relationship between them.  Third, we will present Rahner‟s Molinist model of 
 7 
inspiration, which—since it finds relatively little magisterial echo—will be treated on its own 
terms.  Finally, we will explore the Lohfink‟s model of Old Testament inerrancy, which seems to 
presuppose Rahner‟s theory of inspiration as its point de départ.  Both of these models furnished 
important background for Joseph Ratzinger, who seems to have pursued the insights of Rahner 
and Lohfink in a more Bonaventurean and personalist vein. 
We will, however, give more attention to the Thomist model.  One motive for doing so is the 
fact that the aforementioned theory serves as a stronger counterpoint to Ratzinger‟s own.  
Additionally, the Thomist model more deeply informed magisterial reflection on Scripture from 
Vatican I to Vatican II, inclusive.  Though Rahner‟s “ecclesial-predefinitive” theory of 
inspiration, as well as Lohfink‟s related theory of inerrancy, emerged in advance of the Council‟s 
closing, they were not sufficiently well-developed to produce positive new formulations in Dei 
Verbum (1965).  Though one could say that the Dogmatic Constitution distances itself from 
specifically Thomist formulations, a somewhat pixillated version of the “prophetic-instrumental” 
still model undergirds the theology of the most authoritative teaching on Scripture.       
[I] Thomist-Prophetic-Instrumental Inspiration 
 
We will present Benoit‟s neo-Thomist version of the process of inspiration, along with its 
magisterial echoes, in three steps: 1) an explanation of the typology “Thomist-prophetic-
instrumental,” 2) an appreciation of its agreeable conclusion, and 3) an acknowledgment of its 
questionable assumptions. 
[I.1] Typology 
Thomist: The rise of the “Thomist-prophetic-instrumental” owed much to both historical 
circumstances and the perennial greatness of the Angelic Doctor.  Providing an adequate 
conceptual frame for the phenomenon of Scriptural inspiration has long bedeviled theologians.  
 8 
The 19
th
 Century actually witnessed the rise of various theories of inspiration, the most 
influential of which were worked out according to the tradition of Jesuit scholasticism.
14
  This 
notwithstanding, under the impulse of Leo XIII‟s encyclical Aeterni Patris (1879), which 
required all seminaries to teach theology ad mentem sancti Thomae, the Angelic Doctor began to 
receive greater scholarly attention.  Unfortunately, Thomas never treated biblical inspiration in 
so many words.  Hence, scholars interested in this topic were left to ransack the Angelic Doctor‟s 
considerable oeuvre for conceptual frames that bore a family resemblance.  The Dominicans P. 
Synave and P. Benoit finally hit upon such serviceable frames in Thomas‟ treatments of 
instrumental causality and prophecy.
15
  From the 1940s to the 1950s, the period of Ratzinger‟s 
theological formation, their theory enjoyed the status of a classic.
16
  
Prophetic: The general Thomist approach was to treat scriptural authors as writing 
prophets, mutatis mutandis.  On the reading of Synave and Benoit, Thomas understood prophecy 
to be “knowledge, supernaturally given to man, of truths exceeding the present reach of his mind, 
which God teaches for the benefit of the community.”17  Inspiration resembled prophecy 
inasmuch as it was presupposed an intellectual center, a supernatural influence, and a communal 
purpose.  However, inspiration differed from prophecy inasmuch as it necessarily included an 
impulse to write but did not necessarily include “truths exceeding the present reach” of the 
human mind.  Thomas distinguishes two aspects of the prophetic gift, with the principal element 
                                                 
14
 For more on this shift away from the Jesuit theories of inspiration, the most eminent exponent of which was the 
Jesuit Cardinal Franzelin, see “Verbal Inspiration” in James Tunstead Burtchaell, Catholic Theories of Biblical 
Inspiration since 1810: A Review and Critique (London: London, Cambridge UP, 1969), 121-162.; Robert Gnuse, 
The Authority of the Bible (New York: Paulist, 1985), 42-46.  
15
 See especially Summa Theologiae IIae-IIa, qq. 171-178.   
16
 Writing in 1969, Burtchaell notes that “[Benoit‟s] theory has enjoyed a period of unchallenged popularity similar 
to that according to Franzelin‟s from 1870 until 1890.”  He goes on to note that, despite a few critical remarks here 
and there, “By and large, the Benoit position rises as the classic theory of the years immediate after Divino Afflante 
Spiritu” [Burtchaell, Catholic Theories of Biblical Inspiration since 1810: A Review and Critique, 244-45]. 
17
 Paul Synave and Pierre Benoit, Prophecy and Inspiration: A Commentary on the Summa Theologica II-II, 
Questions 171-178, trans. Avery Dulles and Thomas L. Sheridan (New York: Desclee Co., 1961), 61. 
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being the supernatural light (lumen) guiding the formation of judgment, and the secondary 
element being the mental representation (species) upon which the enlightened intellect 
pronounces judgment.
18
  Thomas thought it possible for God to grant the primary element 
without the secondary, that is, to take “human matters already represented in his mind, and to 
illuminate these naturally acquired representations without altering their intrinsically natural 
character.”19  This influx of supernatural lumen without supernatural species Thomas called 
inspiratio.
20
  Hence, when Thomas describes the hagiographers (a term for scriptural authors 
borrowed from St. Jerome) ex inspiratione Spiritus Sancti scribentes, he is affirming (minimally) 
that they enjoy supernatural lumen, not that they enjoy supernatural species (e.g., prophetic 
visions or locutions).
21
  An important implication of this distinction is that hagiographers, unlike 
prophets, may work effectively without thematic awareness of being inspired.   
Instrumental: Since Thomas occasionally speaks of prophets as divine instruments,
22
 
Benoit and Synave apply the notion of instrumental causality to the phenomenon of inspiration.  
By their own admission, however, they can do so only in a “broad and improper sense.”23  By 
strict definition, an instrument operates according to its own nature but lacks its own source of 
movement.  The chisel operates according to the hardness of its steel, but must nevertheless wait 
for the sculptor—the principal cause—to employ it.  Hence, both the sculptor (principally) and 
the chisel (instrumentally) can be called causes of a given statue.  But an inspired writer can be 
reckoned an instrument only “broadly and improperly” speaking since, as a conscious agent, he 
alone has an intrinsic source of movement.  Nevertheless, the hagiographer does resemble an 
                                                 
18
 ibid., 64. 
19
 ibid., 66. 
20
 This was often contrasted with revelatio in the theology manuals up until the time of Vatican II.  Revelatio 
involved a supernatural species as well as a supernatural lumen.  See ibid., 68-70. 
21
 ibid., 71.  For St. Thomas‟ presentation, see ST II-II, 174, 2, obj. 3. 
22
 Synave and Benoit underscore that Thomas actually mentions instrumental causality in connection with prophecy 
only twice (ST IIae-IIa q. 172, a. 4, ad 1; q. 173, a. 4).  
23
 ibid., 80. 
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instrument in two important ways: 1) he cannot act as an inspired writer whenever he wills, but 
only when the principal cause so uses him; 2) the effect of his acts are proportionate not to his 
own natural power but to that of the principal agent—the Holy Spirit.24  This means that 
Scripture will contain traces of its divine authorship. 
Though not adopted in every detail, the prophetic-instrumental model received broad 
support from the papal encyclicals during the period between the councils. Providentissimus 
spoke of the human authors as “inspired instruments.”25  Spiritus Paraclitus evoked instrumental 
categories when it called God “principal cause of all that Scripture means and says.”26  Even the 
specifically Thomistic contours of prophetic-instrumental inspiration were commended in Pius 
XII‟s encyclical Divino Afflante Spiritu.27  Dei Verbum was much more restrained, but continued 
to affirm that God “employed” men, who wrote “with God himself acting in them and through 
them.”28  In more and less explicit ways, then, the prophetic-instrumental dominated the 
doctrinal history of the 20
th
 Century. 
                                                 
24
 Disproportionate effect seems, in fact, to be one of the key features distinguishing God‟s instrumental causality 
and his general providence over creation.  As Synave and Benoit point out, Thomas is most comfortable describing 
humans as instruments in sacramental ministry and thaumaturgy, in actions that beyond human capacity simpliciter.  
See ibid., 77.  Scriptural inspiration is less “instrumental” than thaumaturgy, for instance, because the effect is, in 
one sense, proportionate to the instrument: i.e., it is within human power to write.  On the other hand, it is more 
instrumental than the general providence that God exercises through created causes, since Scripture exhibits certain 
properties surpassing human ability (i.e., sensus plenior, inerrancy).  See J. T. Forestell, "Limitation of Inerrancy," 
Catholic Biblical Quarterly 20, no. 1 (01/01, 1958), 11. 
25
  Providentissimus Deus §41; Bechard, The Scripture Documents: An Anthology of Official Catholic Teachings, 
55. 
26
 §3; ibid., 84. 
27
 “… Catholic theologians, following the teaching of the holy Fathers and especially of the Angelic and Common 
Doctor, have examined and explained the nature and effects of biblical inspiration more exactly and more fully than 
was want to be done in previous ages.  For having begun by expounding minutely the principle that the inspired 
writer, in composing the sacred book, is the living and reasonable instrument (ὄπγανον) of the Holy Spirit, they 
rightly observe that, impelled by the divine motion, he so uses his faculties and powers that from the book composed 
by him all may easily infer „the special character of each one and, as it were, his personal traits.‟”  See Divino 
Afflante Spiritu §19; ibid., 128.    
28
 “In composing the sacred Books, God chose and employed (adhibuit) certain men (homines), who, while engaged 
in this task, made full use of their faculties and powers, so that, with God himself acting in them and through them, 
they as true authors committed to writing everything and only those things that he wanted written” [§11; ibid., 24].  
Commentators, however, note that the absence of language such as auctor principalis may represent a slight retreat 
from specifically Thomistic prophetic-instrumental model.  See Alois Grillmeier, "The Divine Inspiration and the 
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[I.2] Agreeable Conclusions 
 
The Thomist model entails several conclusions agreeable to Catholic doctrine and 
practice, among which three stand out: 1) the distinctiveness of Scripture, 2) the unity and 
diversity of divine and human wills, and 3) the propriety of scientific exegesis.    
Distinctiveness: First, by locating the uniqueness of Scripture in the transient and 
individual charism of inspiration, neo-Thomists were able to distinguish cleanly between 
hagiographers and the community at large—whether Israel or the Church.  This gave a Scripture 
a distinctive and stable status and vis-à-vis the Church and her theology.  If God really becomes 
Scripture‟s principal author, then Scripture becomes God‟s Word—not simply words about 
God.
29
  This suggests why the teaching office of the Church is inferior in authority to Scripture.
30
  
In these regards, the prophetic-instrumental theory satisfies important doctrinal requirements laid 
down at Vatican I.  On the Thomist model of inspiration, the Church would not be giving 
subsequent approval to a work of “simple human industry,” as if she were the sufficient author of 
Scripture; nor would she appear to be granting a nihil obstat to a book containing only 
“revelation without error.”31  Otherwise, Scripture would differ in no way from theology or 
dogma.   
                                                                                                                                                             
Interpretation of Sacred Scripture," in Commentary on the Documents of Vatican II, ed. Herbert Vorgrimler, trans. 
Glen-Doepl William, Vol. III (New York: New York Herder and Herder, 1967), 203.; Farkasfalvy, Inspiration and 
Interpretation, 84.     
29
 Dei Verbum seems to imply as much when it contrasts theology with the inspired Word: “Sacred theology rests 
upon the Word of God, together with sacred Tradition, as its permanent foundation … The Sacred Scriptures contain 
the Word of God and, because they are inspired, they truly are the Word of God.”  See Dei Verbum §24; Bechard, 
The Scripture Documents: An Anthology of Official Catholic Teachings, 29.  
30
 “…This teaching office is not above the Word of God but serves it by teaching only what has been handed on.”  
See Dei Verbum §10; ibid., 23. 
31
 Scripture is, nonetheless, still especially entrusted to the Church.  Vatican I distinguishes between Scripture and 
all statements producible by herself in the follow way: “These [books] the Church holds to be sacred and canonical, 
not because, having been composed by simple human industry, they were later approved by her own authority; nor 
merely because they contain revelation without error; but because, having been written under the inspiration of the 
Holy Spirit, they have God for their author and were delivered as such to the Church" (Dei Filius, §2; ibid., 17).  On 
these grounds, Avery Cardinal Dulles speaks of the fixing of the Canon as an act of “reception” rather than 
 12 
Unity-in-Diversity: Second, the prophetic-instrumental model associates the divine and 
human intentions without collapsing them.  Because the divine influence is seen to operate “from 
within,” God becomes the auctor principalis of whatever the human instrument freely intends in 
composing his works.  This means minimally that God‟s sense must include the hagiographer‟s 
sense, and that the literal sense—understood as the “mind of the [human] author”32—becomes 
the foundation for all exegesis.
33
  Benoit‟s theory consequently proved incompatible with most 
restrictions on inerrancy; for inspiration is thereby understood as an 
impulse which totally subjects the mind of a man to the divine influence … and which 
extends to the ultimate realization of the work “ad verba.”  With such a close and 
complete compenetration of divine and human causality it is impossible that the writer 
express anything whatever contrary to the divine pleasure.
34
 
  
These implications were not lost on the Magisterium.  Leo XIII logically points out that, 
if one attempted to “save” God‟s veracity by restricting responsibility for problematic passages 
to defective human instruments, one could no longer say that God “was the Author of the entire 
Scripture.”35  Any error imputable to the human instrument is ultimately imputable to God, since, 
as Dei Verbum affirms, “everything asserted by the inspired authors or sacred writers should be 
regarded as inspired by the Holy Spirit.”36   
                                                                                                                                                             
authorship.  See Avery Dulles, Magisterium : Teacher and Guardian of the Faith (Naples, FL: Sapientia Press of 
Ave Maria University, 2007), 102-104.  
32
 Divino Afflante Spiritu §15; Bechard, The Scripture Documents: An Anthology of Official Catholic Teachings, 
125. 
33
 Pius XII reminds Catholic exegetes that “their foremost and greatest endeavor should be to discern and define 
clearly that sense of the biblical words that is called „literal‟” [Divino Afflante Spiritu §15; ibid., 125], and enjoins 
them scrupulously to “refrain from proposing as the genuine meaning of Sacred Scripture other figurative senses” 
[Divino Afflante Spiritu §16;  ibid., 126].  While not linking authorial intention directly with the “literal” sense, Dei 
Verbum does re-affirm that “the interpreter of Sacred Scripture … should carefully search out what the sacred 
writers truly intended to expresses and what God thought well to manifest by their words” [§12;  ibid., 24]. 
34
 Synave and Benoit, Prophecy and Inspiration: A Commentary on the Summa Theologica II-II, Questions 171-178, 
141. 
35
 Providentissimus Deus, §41; Bechard, The Scripture Documents: An Anthology of Official Catholic Teachings, 
56.   
36
 §11; ibid., 24.  Here Dei Verbum reaffirms the principle used by the Pontifical Biblical Commission throughout 
the early twentieth Century, namely “the Catholic doctrine regarding the inspiration and inerrancy of Sacred 
Scripture, whereby everything the sacred writer asserts, expresses, and suggests must be held to be asserted, 
 13 
At the same time, the prophetic-instrumental model could claim to explain Scripture‟s 
“fuller sense.”  Though God‟s intention necessarily includes the author‟s intention, the converse 
would not hold.  The effects brought about by an instrumental cause are proportioned to the inner 
possibilities of the principal cause, not to those of the instrumental cause.  Hence, Scripture may 
contain divine meaning exceeding—though not directly contradicting—what the human author 
consciously intended.
37
  With such a strong regulatory role for intention of the human author, 
however, the space by which the sensus plenior could exceed the sensus literalis was by not self-
evident.        
  Exegesis: Third, the Thomist model gives impetus to the scientific investigation of 
Scripture.  Because the instrumental model supposes that Holy Spirit inspires without coercion, 
guiding the hagiographer freely and in harmony with his own genius, exegetes must expect 
Scripture to speak in an eminently human manner.  Pius XII cites the Angelic Doctor in this 
connection: “In Scripture divine things are presented to us in the manner which is in common use 
among men.”38  Extrapolating from this principle, Pius concludes that “no one with a correct idea 
of biblical inspiration will be surprised to find, even in the sacred writers … so-called 
„approximations‟ and certain hyperbolic, even at times paradoxical, modes of expression that, 
among ancient peoples and especially those of the East, human language used to express its 
                                                                                                                                                             
expressed and suggested by the Holy Spirit …” [Responsa ad proposita dubia de parousia sue de secundo adventu 
D.N. Iesu Christi in epistolis S. Pauli Apostoli, June 18, 1915;  ibid., 207]. 
37
 “For the language of the Bible is employed to express, under the inspiration of the Holy Ghost, many things which 
are beyond the power and scope of the reason of man - that is to say, divine mysteries and all that is related to them. 
There is sometimes in such passages a fullness and a hidden depth of meaning which the letter hardly expresses and 
which the laws of interpretation hardly warrant. Moreover, the literal sense itself frequently admits other senses, 
adapted to illustrate dogma or to confirm morality” [Providentissimus Deus, §27; ibid., 47].  Benedict XV holds St. 
Jerome up as a model of those who “pass form the literal to the more profound meaning in temperate fashion” 
[Spiritus Paraclitus §14; ibid., 102].  Pius XII enjoins exegetes to search out both the “literal meaning of the words 
intended and expressed by the sacred writer” as well as the “spiritual sense, provided it is clearly intended by God” 
[Divino Afflante Spiritu §16; ibid., 126]. 
38
 Divino Afflante Spiritu §20; ibid., 129.  Pius XII cites Thomas‟ Commentary on the Letter to the Hebrews cap. 1, 
lectio 4 [Parma ed. 13:678]. 
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thought…”39    Champions of scientific exegesis, in other words, could easily recruit the Angelic 
Doctor to their cause. 
[I.2] Questionable Assumptions 
 
Despite its strengths, the Thomistic model also rested on two increasingly implausible 
assumptions, which—while never explicitly affirmed or even trotted out for debate—tended to 
shape the Catholic theological imagination.  First, the sacred books were often presumed 
monographs.  This was suggested, in the first place, by the attribution of books to particular 
authors (e.g., Moses, David, Solomon).  However, modeling the charism of inspiration on the 
solitary prophetic vocation only reinforced this presumption of unitary human authorship.     
The second assumption, i.e., the predominantly propositional character of Scriptural 
truth, followed from the first.  Since Thomas described inspiration as a charism (lumen) for 
judging affairs (species) according to divine truth, the predominant model of Scriptural truth 
became adaequatio rei et intellectus.
40
  The more inspired a book, the more replete it would be 
with enlightened propositional judgments.  According to Providentissimus Deus, Scripture 
represented an “arsenal of heavenly arms” for those whose responsibility it is to “handle Catholic 
doctrine before the learned and the unlearned.”41  And even though exegetes were exhorted to 
interpret each statement according to broader context and literary genres, these considerations 
seemed to enter the picture only inasmuch as they illumined the hagiographer‟s thought 
                                                 
39
 Divino Afflante Spiritu §20; ibid., 129. 
40
 Synave and Benoit proceed from this definition when they undertake to define the scope of inerrancy: “Truth is 
the „adequatio rei et intellectus.‟  It exists only in the judgment.  And by „judgment‟ we obviously do not mean every 
proposition made up of a subject, verb, and predicate, but the formal act by which the intellect (intellectus) affirms 
its conformity (adequatio) to the object of knowledge (res).”  See Synave and Benoit, Prophecy and Inspiration: A 
Commentary on the Summa Theologica II-II, Questions 171-178, 134.   
41
 This is the tendency of some passages of Providentissimus: “Let all, therefore, especially the novices of the 
ecclesiastical army, understand how deeply the sacred Books should be esteemed, and with what eagerness and 
reverence they should approach this great arsenal of heavenly arms. For those whose duty it is to handle Catholic 
doctrine before the learned or the unlearned will nowhere find more ample matter or more abundant exhortation, 
whether on the subject of God, the supreme Good and the all-perfect Being, or of the works which display His Glory 
and His love.”  See Providentissimus §1; Bechard, The Scripture Documents: An Anthology of Official Catholic 
Teachings, 39. 
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process;
42
 for the “primary sense” of each passage was given by “the meaning which the human 
author intended.”43  And because the meaning of each part amounted to what the inspired author 
intended, this principle gave the parts of Scripture a certain semantic stability and independence 
vis-à-vis the whole of Scripture.  Despite such advantages, the fortunes of the propositional 
model of biblical truth were tied up with first assumption, that of monographic biblical 
composition.  The Bible was plausibly read as a repository of inspired judgments only to the 
degree that a single, judging intellectus was supposed to stand behind any given passage. 
[II] Thomist Inerrancy and its Qualifications  
 
The prophetic-instrumental model of inspiration left but a single domain open wherein the 
exegete, without implicating God in falsehood, could limit the inerrancy of Scripture—the 
domain of the author‟s judgment.  One could not even exclude Scripture‟s “secular” (e.g., 
scientific, historical) judgments from the sphere of immunity, as the following syllogism makes 
clear: 
1) Inspiration, understood as God‟s instrumental use of sacred writers, requires that 
everything asserted by the sacred writers be asserted by the Spirit. 
2) The Spirit, as both Creator and Sanctifier, can assert nothing false in any sphere of human 
knowledge. 
3) Therefore, inspired writers cannot have asserted formal error according to any human 
science.   
 
Compelled by such logic, the Church condemned—in no fewer than four encyclicals—all 
attempts to restrict the inerrancy of Scripture to those parts of the Bible treating faith and morals.  
Providentissimus Deus condemns those who hold that “divine inspiration regards the things of 
                                                 
42
 Benoit does not leave the role of the whole of Scripture out the analysis.  In a statement that suggests both his 
propositionalism and his supposition of monographic authorship, Benoit notes that sometimes scriptural authors “do 
not vouch for their own private opinions, or even convictions, because God does not want them to and has them 
write accordingly.  How will we know this?  By objective study of the book; not of this or that proposition taken in 
isolation and considered as an absolute, but of the whole ensemble in which the intent of the author is expressed, and 
upon which depends the role of the individual proposition.”  See Synave and Benoit, Prophecy and Inspiration: A 
Commentary on the Summa Theologica II-II, Questions 171-178, 141  Italics mine. 
43
 ibid., 147.  Italics original. 
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faith and morals and nothing beyond.”44  Pius X upbraids the modernists for holding that “in the 
sacred Books there are many passages referring to science and history where manifest errors are 
to be found.”45  Spiritus Paraclitus closes another loophole when it condemns the position that 
the “effects of inspiration—namely, absolute truth and immunity from error—are to be restricted 
to the primary or religious element.”46  Pius XII sums up the tradition, repeating Leo‟s censure of 
“some Catholic writers,” who “ventured to restrict the truth of Sacred Scripture solely to matters 
of faith and morals, and to regard other matters, whether in the domain of physical science or 
history, as "obiter dicta" and - as they contended - in no wise connected with faith.”47 
Dei Verbum did not directly gainsay the previous formulations.
48
  The Dogmatic 
Constitution taught that “we must acknowledge the Books of Scripture as teaching firmly, 
faithfully, and without error the truth that God wished to be recorded in the sacred writings for 
the sake of salvation (veritatem, quam Deus nostrae salutis causa Litteris Sacris consignari 
voluit).”49  Though nostrae salutis causa (“for the sake of salvation”) has often been taken to 
mark a reversal of the position of the biblical encyclicals, recent analyses of both the Latin text
50
 
and its drafting history
51
 suggest that the phrase pertains only to the purpose of scriptural truth—
                                                 
44
 §40;  Bechard, The Scripture Documents: An Anthology of Official Catholic Teachings, 55. 
45
 Pascendi Dominici Gregis §118; ibid., 74. 
46
 §5; ibid., 88. 
47
 Divino Afflante Spiritu §1; ibid., 116. 
48
  It is commonly reported that the council fathers, in order to achieve near unanimity, agreed not to decide anything 
“new” vis-à-vis the biblical encyclicals.  Grillmeier notes, for instance, that Paul VI expressed his perplessitá over 
penultimate draft of Dei Verbum because it seemed to offer a more restrictive view of inerrancy, a “doctrine not yet 
general in the scriptural and theological instruction of the Church.”  See Grillmeier, The Divine Inspiration and the 
Interpretation of Sacred Scripture, 213  Fr. Dennis Farkasfalvy, OCSO observes, “Despite more than a century of 
bickering over the Bible‟s antiquated notions about the physical world and events of history as errors, the experts of 
the Council did not manage to reformulate the issue of inerrancy.”  See Farkasfalvy, Inspiration and Interpretation, 
87.   
49
 §11;  Bechard, The Scripture Documents: An Anthology of Official Catholic Teachings, 24. 
50
 For a linguistic analysis see, Harrison, Restricted Inerrancy and the 'Hermeneutic of Discontinuity', 233-236. 
51
 Several scholars point out that, at the eleventh hour, the council fathers replaced the formulation veritates 
salutares with veritatem … nostrae causa salutis so as to avoid the impression of having narrowed the scope of 
inerrancy to matters of faith and morals.  See Grillmeier, The Divine Inspiration and the Interpretation of Sacred 
Scripture, 211; Farkasfalvy, Inspiration and Interpretation, 87; Avery Dulles, "The Interpretation of the Bible in the 
Church," in Kirche Sein, ed. Wilhelm Geerlings and Max Seckler (Freiburg: Herder, 1994), 36-37. 
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not to its material scope.  Nowhere, then, did the Church explicitly disavow her previous 
teaching: namely, that inspiration extends to all parts of the Bible and that inerrancy extends to 
every topic formally treated by the sacred authors. 
Despite the Church‟s sweeping claims regarding the veracity of Scripture, theologians 
devoted considerable energies to qualifying them in the one safe realm—the mind of the 
hagiographer.  This meant developing a sophisticated taxonomy of mental postures, which neo-
Thomist rational psychology readily supplied.  According to Thomas, one could incur formal 
error only to the extent that one judged erroneously.  Moreover, the scope and strength of any 
judgment could be qualified in various ways.  Synave and Benoit, writing in the years just after 
Divino Afflante Spiritu, consider the sacred author‟s judgment to be qualified primarily by the 1) 
formal object, 2) the degree of affirmation, and 3) the author‟s communicative intention.  All 
three qualifications merit closer examination. 
[II.1] Formal Object 
 
By formal object, Benoit means simply the “point of view from which [the author] is treating his 
subject.”52  The true object of the mind‟s judgment is not the material object, which would 
include every aspect of the reality in question, but the formal object, which includes only those 
aspects of a reality to which the intellect attends.  A professor of geometry and a professor art 
may, for instance, both look at the moon and declare it “perfectly round.”  The professor of 
geometry, speaking from a geometrical point of view, would be in formal error (since the moon 
is, in fact, slightly elliptical); whereas the professor of art, speaking only from an aesthetic point 
of view, might be in material error only.  For the purposes of art, which requires geometrical 
accuracy only to the tolerances of the naked eye, the moon is “perfectly round.”  Hence, before 
                                                 
52
 Synave and Benoit, Prophecy and Inspiration: A Commentary on the Summa Theologica II-II, Questions 171-178, 
137. 
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deciding whether any passage is formally erroneous, one must take into account the author‟s 
interest in and perspective on the event he relates. 
 Without using the technical language of obiectum formale, official Church documents 
seem to grant this criterion cautious approval.  We can sense the caution in Leo‟s condemnation 
of attempts to restrict inerrancy to the soundness of the further purposes that God may have had 
in inspiring scriptural statements.
53
  This would have been tantamount to reducing inerrancy to 
sincerity.  Leo does, one the other hand, legitimate recourse to the objectum formale—albeit not 
in so many words—when he concedes that neither the sacred author nor the Holy Spirit was 
seeking to “penetrate the secrets of nature” and that they, therefore, saw fit to describe the world 
“in more or less figurative language.”54  Leo also foresaw that the same principle could be 
applied to “cognate sciences and especially to History.”55  Dei Verbum gives conciliar sanction 
to this approach when it describes the historicity of the Gospels as proportioned to the distinct 
interests of the evangelists.
56
 
[II.2] Degree of Affirmation 
 
Authorial assertion could also be qualified according to the degree of affirmation.  The varying 
degrees of affirmation were invoked mainly to account for phenomena such as unfulfilled, 
“minatory” prophecies (which, as the theory goes, the author affirmed only probably or 
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 Providentissimus proscribes the idea that, “in a question of the truth or falsehood of a passage, we should consider 
not so much what God has said as the reason and purpose which He had in mind in saying it—this system cannot be 
tolerated” [§40; Bechard, The Scripture Documents: An Anthology of Official Catholic Teachings, 55].  This, at any 
rate, is the interpretation of Synave and Benoit to Leo‟s statement.  See Synave and Benoit, Prophecy and 
Inspiration: A Commentary on the Summa Theologica II-II, Questions 171-178, 143. 
54
 “… [W]e must remember, first, that the sacred writers, or to speak more accurately, the Holy Ghost „Who spoke 
by them, did not intend to teach men these things (that is to say, the essential nature of the things of the visible 
universe), things in no way profitable unto salvation.‟ Hence they did not seek to penetrate the secrets of nature, but 
rather described and dealt with things in more or less figurative language, or in terms which were commonly used at 
the time, and which in many instances are in daily use at this day, even by the most eminent men of science” [§39; 
Bechard, The Scripture Documents: An Anthology of Official Catholic Teachings, 54]. 
55
 §40; ibid., 54. 
56
 “In composing the four Gospels, the sacred writers selected certain of the many traditions that had been handed on 
either orally or already in written form; others they summarized or explicated with an eye to the situation of the 
churches” [§19; ibid., 28].  Emphasis mine. 
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conditionally) and “implicit citations” (which, again, the author mentioned but did not personally 
vouch for).
57
  Because of the possibility of abuse, this qualification was little used and coolly 
received by the Magisterium.  Pascendi listed “tacit citations” among the strategies employed by 
“certain other moderns who somewhat restrict inspiration.”58  Spiritus Paraclitus censured those 
who “take too ready a refuge in such notions as „implicit quotations‟ …”59  The Pontifical 
Biblical Commission approved such means only when internal citation could be “proved by solid 
arguments.”60  Qualification of degree of affirmation was valid in principle, but typically 
employed as a last resort. 
[II.3] Communicative Intention 
 
According to Benoit, an author‟s communicative intention could also limit inerrancy.  In contrast 
to both formal object and degree of affirmation, communicative intention qualifies authorial 
judgment in the volitional or “moral order” (as opposed to the “intellectual order).”61  Since 
inspiration is a charism of knowledge with social finality, inerrancy extends only to that for 
which the sacred author assumes a social responsibility; and the author, in turn, “assumes a 
social responsibility only for what he submits to another for assent.”62  The application of 
communicative intention in which the 20
th
 Century Magisterium put most stock was attention to 
literary genre, which signaled the kind of assent for which an author was calling.  Divino 
Afflante, for instance, expressed hope that the study of literary genre would resolve all remaining 
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 See Synave and Benoit, Prophecy and Inspiration: A Commentary on the Summa Theologica II-II, Questions 171-
178, 134-135. 
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 §64; Bechard, The Scripture Documents: An Anthology of Official Catholic Teachings, 72. 
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 §7; ibid., 90. 
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 Reponsum circa citationes implicitas in Sacra Scriptura contentas, Feb. 13, 1905; ibid., 187. 
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 Synave and Benoit, Prophecy and Inspiration: A Commentary on the Summa Theologica II-II, Questions 171-178, 
135. 
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 ibid., 136. 
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doubts about the inerrancy of Scripture.
63
  At the conciliar level, Dei Verbum enjoined exegetes 
to discover the author‟s expressive intention as embedded in “literary forms.”64  It therefore 
encouraged Catholic exegetes to undertake philological and cultural studies in defense of the 
Catholic faith. 
 In sum, the prophetic-instrumental model of inspiration and inerrancy—classically 
exposited by Benoit—preferred to speak of inspired and inerrant authors.  Despite certain 
problematic assumptions, it had several strengths: it was respectful of magisterial definitions, 
spoke in a language familiar to the international body of theologians, and used the sophistication 
of Thomist rational psychology to avoid wooden literalism.  Perhaps not surprisingly, it became 
something of a “classic” in the years of Joseph Ratzinger‟s theological formation. 
 [III] Molinist-Ecclesial-Predefinitve Inspiration 
 
Despite these advantages, the Thomist model did not entirely satisfy Karl Rahner, who 
responded to the new exegetical situation with his own Molinist-ecclesial-predefinitive model of 
inspiration. We characterize Rahner‟s approach as “Molinist” (as opposed to “Thomist”) because 
his principal “theological muse” seems to be the 17th Century Jesuit Luis de Molina (1536-1600); 
as “ecclesial” (as opposed to “prophetic”), because the human author functions primarily as 
bearer of the Church‟s primitive consciousness; and as “predefinitive” (as opposed to 
“instrumental”), because the mode of divine-human interaction is explained through the Molinist 
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 “Hence the Catholic commentator, in order to comply with the present needs of biblical studies in explaining the 
Sacred Scripture and in demonstrating and proving its immunity from all error, should also make a prudent use of 
this means, determining, that is, to what extent the manner of expression or the literary mode adopted by the sacred 
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64
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literary forms that were in use during that time” [§12; ibid., 25]. 
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notion of formal predefinition.  In the order of presentation, however, we will explain how 
Rahner‟s model is 1) Molinist, 2) predefinitive, and 3) ecclesial. 
[III.1] Typology Explained   
Molinist: Several commentators have pointed out Rahner‟s indebtedness to the 
specifically Jesuit tradition of scholasticism.  Ratzinger, for his part, cites the influence of the 
Francisco de Suárez, SJ (1548-1617).
65
  Burtchaell divines, at least in the specific matter of 
inspiration, the wraith of Luis de Molina, SJ (1536-1600),
66
 the father of the “distinctively Jesuit 
school of philosophy and theology.”67  Molina was best known for the position—broadly shared 
with Suárez
68—that “efficacious grace infallibly led to human assent, not from its own internal 
nature, but from the free consent of the created will, which consent God foreknows …”69  This 
contradicted “what was accepted as the Thomistic theory of God‟s physical predetermination of 
acts to a definite outcome,”70 and thereby touched off the De auxiliis controversy that dominated 
the 17
th
 Century theology.   
In nuce, followers of Molina (and Jesuit theologians generally) tended to view human and 
divine responsibility as mutually exclusive, whereas the Dominicans tended to view them as co-
extensive.  In keeping with this general sensibility, Molinists tended to carve out distinct 
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 Speaking of his collaboration with Karl Rahner to circulate an alternative schema to De Fontibus Revelationis, 
Ratzinger recalls, “As we worked together, it became obvious to me that, despite our agreement in many desires and 
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Ratzinger, Milestones : Memoirs, 1927-1977 (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1998), 128.   
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 Doyle, Hispanic Scholastic Philosophy, 260. 
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contributions for God and man in any joint project.  The classic 19
th
 century expression of 
Molinist-flavored biblical inspiration was the Jesuit Cardinal Franzelin‟s res et sententia theory, 
which attributed inspired ideas to the Holy Spirit but left the choice of words to the ingenuity of 
the human author.
71
   
 Rahner, for his part, challenges the Thomist theory out of this same typically Jesuit 
concern for legitimate freedom.  There is, first of all, the legitimate freedom of the theologian 
vis-à-vis the teaching of Trent that Scripture has God as its auctor.
72
  Rahner notes note that this 
particular definition has often been interpreted too narrowly.  The word auctor can be construed 
as narrowly as “literary author” (Verfasser) or as broadly as “originator” (Urheber).73  One 
could, therefore, satisfy doctrinal requirements simply by affirming God as Scripture‟s 
Urheber—provided, of course, that one could show God to be Urheber in sufficiently a unique 
way. 
Secondly, there is the legitimate freedom of the human author.  As Rahner sees it, truly 
human authorship remains irreconcilable with instrumental subordination.  For if God is causa 
principalis, then He cannot help but be sole “literary author”; for the principal cause is always 
pre-eminently responsible for any work achieved via instruments.  Furthermore, comprehensive 
“literary authorship” cannot be attributed to both God and the hagiographers, since the “same 
work under the same angle” cannot be ascribed to two causes.74  Despite all Benoit‟s protests 
that God employs His instruments “d’une façon libre et personelle,”75 strict adherence to 
instrumental model logically reduces human authorship to a “secretarial” function.  A space for 
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genuinely human authorship opens only when one can point to the distinct contribution of divine 
authorship to the total effect.  For Rahner, inasmuch as instrumental causality effectively makes 
God the Verfasser of every aspect of Scripture—even “ad verba”—it precludes truly human 
authorship. 
Predefinitive: As an alternative to instrumental causation, Rahner proposes that God‟s 
influence over Scripture be conceived as variety of efficacious grace—i.e., “formal predefinition 
(predeterminatio formalis)”:76 
What is required for the sufficiency of grace (as distinct from merely sufficient grace) 
may depend on some extrinsic circumstances, which, according to the Molinists, has been 
foreseen by God …foreseen and willed by him as material to man‟s decision.  Why 
should we not assume this also to be the case in inspiration, both in regard to the divine 
influence on human reason and on the human will?  For it is, in fact, this absolutely 
willed efficiency of the influence, that is, a predefining efficiency, that is required by God 
to be the author of the Scriptures.
77
 
   
Applying the model to the question inspiration, God‟s inspiration of Scripture becomes 
equivalent to his arrangement of “external” circumstances in such fashion that the human authors 
would both freely and infallibly follow his will.  He might, for instance, “accomplish the 
motioning of the writer‟s will by causing him to be asked through other people to produce 
[biblical] writings.”78  Formal predefinition, moreover, would allow for true authorship since it 
would allow for distinct contributions.  In an echo of Franzelin‟s res et sententia theory, Rahner 
allows that the bible‟s “literary form is not God‟s own work.”79 
Despite the ostensible simplicity of this solution, Rahner is aware that it raises new 
problems.  Most notably, Rahner must further specify the Molinist theory of efficacious grace in 
order to account for the distinctiveness of Scripture.  For if God brings about Scripture only as 
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infallibly as he brings about any other good deed, how Scripture would differ from any other 
edifying—or even merely unobjectionable—writing?  How would Scripture be the Word of God 
and not merely words about God?  Rahner answer this objection by adding two specifications.  
First, he notes that God‟s influence is not simply an act of formal predefinition; it is an act of 
“redemptive-historical” predefinition.80  If Scripture is to be uniquely God‟s word, then God‟s 
influence over it must also demonstrate a certain spatio-temporal concentration:   
A formal predefinition of the human act springing from the transcendental world, as it 
were, anonymously, would not constitute the result and work in a special degree really 
God‟s own.  The predefining act of God may not only support the world as a whole and 
its single happenings, as divine causality supports everything in its totality and each thing 
individually, but it must operate from a particular point in space and time in preference 
to any other.
81
   
 
Though speaking at a high level of abstraction, it is clear that Rahner is here referring to what is 
more commonly known as salvation history.  Whatever God achieves by salvation-historical 
predefinition belongs to Him in a qualitatively unique way; for “the „works‟ of the history of 
redemption are God‟s in some other, higher way than the works of nature.”82  Salvation history 
thus becomes, in a certain sense, God‟s own history in the world. 
Ecclesial: Second, Rahner notes that the stream of salvation history does not exhibit 
uniform depth.  Some redemptive-historical works are simply “more God‟s” than others.  Indeed, 
salvation history finds “its unique climax in Christ and the Church,” where—in contrast to the 
Synagogue—the “dialogue between God and man” no longer bears the “possibility of frustration 
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or revocation.” 83  The Church, in turn, locates her golden age in her Apostolic era, which “in a 
qualitatively unique manner is subject to divine intervention also as distinct from the Church in 
the course of history.”84  The Apostolic age differed from subsequent ages in that she was then 
more norma normans than norma normata, more the recipient of ongoing revelation than the 
guardian of a settled deposit.
85
  In a certain sense, then, one could say that God was auctor of the 
Apostolic Church in a “higher way” than He was auctor of Israel or is auctor of the post-
Apostolic Church.  
Rahner introduces the last premise of his argument by reclassifying Scripture as one of 
the “constitutive elements of this Apostolic Church.”86  As a necessary concomitant to her 
swelling fund of revelation, God granted the Urkirche a sure instinct for “pure self-expression 
and clear and univocal self-delimitation against … pseudo-ecclesiastical and pseudo-Christian 
phenomena.”87  The permanent fruits of such inspired discernment appear in the fixed Scriptural 
canon.  Rahner argues that we can reckon even the Old Testament a “constitutive element” 
inasmuch as Israel‟s book finds completion only in the New Testament era and as an element of 
the Church.
88
  Israel‟s book is inspired as the Church‟s pre-history.  Scripture thus turns out to be 
“more God‟s” than any other writing—whether council, creed, or encyclical—because the 
Apostolic Church, whose fundamental intuitions it permanentized, was “more God‟s” than any 
other redemptive-historical work. 
We are now in a position to be more specific about the respective contributions to the 
Biblical text of God and the human authors.  According to Rahner, God “did not write a letter to 
                                                 
83
 ibid., 41. 
84
 ibid., 42. 
85
 “She had yet to receive revelations anew, and she could not as yet guard and conserve all that she has today, 
because it was not yet revealed to her” [ibid., 46]. 
86
 ibid., 47. 
87
 ibid., 46. 
88
 ibid., 51-54. 
 26 
Philemon,” since he is not Scripture‟s Verfasser.89  However, God became the Urheber of the 
letter to Philemon—from a distinct angle—by superimposing the Apostolic Church‟s vision 
upon Paul‟s, which is to say, by “willing absolutely and effectively that the Church as a 
community of love should manifest for all ages „canonically‟ her nature, her faith, her love, even 
in such a letter.”90  Paul may have authored the letter qua letter, but God authored the letter qua 
ecclesial self-expression.  Through such acts of divine authorship, God ensures that the sacred 
books represent the “adequate objectivity of the primal consciousness of the Church”91 and 
preserve the “sediments” of the early Church‟s faith.92  One can say that God has “inspired” the 
sacred authors, that is, has uniquely appropriated their action to himself, because he plunged 
them into the deepest point of salvation history‟s stream: the Apostolic Church.     
In final analysis, Rahner proposes a dialectical tension between individual and ecclesial 
intentionality.  The Urkirche expresses herself in Scripture, yet her self-expressive activity is 
always carried out by individual persons.  Rahner suggests that that we hold both poles of 
authorship in tension: the human author “writes as member of the Church,” and he “writes as a 
member of the Church.”93  As a member, no author could represent the Church‟s total theology.  
Nonetheless, as a member of the Church, every author was “open to the whole of the Church … 
and was in his own theology always integrated … into the universal theology of the one and 
whole Church of his times.”94  God, in an act of formal predefinition, causes ecclesial intention 
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to supervene upon personal intentions.  As Rahner envisions it, the bearers of inspiration are 
neither divine secretaries nor mystical collectives.  They are ecclesial persons. 
[III.2] Advantages 
For Rahner, the “ecclesial-predefinitive” model was doubly advantageous.  First, it articulated 
divine-human cooperation in such a way as to allow for true human authorship.  Second, by 
making Scripture an element of the Apostolic Church, the Munich divine could solve the 
problem of redundancy.  He asks pointedly, “[W]hat is the point of an infallible teaching 
authority if there is an infallible Bible?  What is the point of an infallible Bible if there is an 
infallible authority?”95  Yet, if Scripture and Magisterium were self-expressions of the same 
Church over whom God exercises special providence, neither could function without the other.  
The former would represent the self-expression of the Church in her “receptive” (i.e., apostolic) 
era; the latter the self-expression of the Church her “interpretive” (i.e. post-apostolic) era.96  
Scripture and Tradition, inspiration and infallibility, thus become something like a single 
ecclesial consciousness operating in receptive and interpretive modes.  Since Scripture would be 
suffused with ecclesial consciousness, the Church—on the basis of her privileged and 
“connatural”97 knowledge—could claim a special interpretive role.  If the explication of 
Scripture were simply the “formal-logical analysis” of propositional content, on the other hand, 
no intelligent person would need a Church.
98
  One could simply work out the deductions oneself.  
Rahner‟s theory can therefore be seen as something of an apologetic for the Church as 
interpretive community.      
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[III.3] Objections  
Naturally, features of Rahner‟s emendation came in for criticism.  The proposal for which 
he caught most flak was his notion of “ecclesial” inspiration.  So called “collective” notions of 
inspiration began to emerge as the findings of critical exegesis, which traced the evolution of 
certain canonical books over the length of eight centuries, slowly permeated the consciousness of 
the Church.
99
  Benoit, for example, in response to the new exegetical situation, was willing to go 
so far as to speak of “analogies of inspiration,” by which he meant that the many biblical actors 
could claim a part-share in the charism of inspiration.
100
  Benoit seems to have preferred the 
language of analogy because it allowed him to account for collaborative biblical authorship 
without invoking what he considered the dubious notion of “collective” inspiration.101  Benoit 
perhaps criticizes Rahner obliquely when he associates “collective inspiration” with a false 
“philosophy of sociology which would impart to a group an autonomous, overriding existence 
which submerges the individual.”102  As Benoit sees it, the “number and anonymity of these 
Biblical workers” need not “gainsay the fact that that they were individuals, moved by the Spirit 
to carry their stone, big or small, and contribute it to the building up of the monument of 
revelation.”103  Schökel, for his part, defends Rahner against such objections up to a point, noting 
that Rahner‟s theory does not really preclude personal inspiration.104  However, even he found 
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that such recourses to collective “consciousness” smacked too much of the Volksgeist of German 
Romanticism.
105
   
Various other concerns were also raised.  Fr. Yves Congar and others felt that portraying 
Scripture as the literary monument of the Church‟s primal consciousness did not sufficiently 
explain the Church‟s awareness of having received Scripture from charismatic individuals.106  
Some doubted that Rahner‟s ecclesial inspiration theory could adequately account for the 
inspiration of the Old Testament.
107
  In short, despite having tied up some loose ends in the 
theory of inspiration, it left others more frayed.   
 Rahner‟s proposal seems to have impacted official doctrinal formulations but little.  At 
the level of private theology, however, Rahner‟s “ecclesial-predefinitive” model did introduce 
the Church as a sort of third party to the phenomenon of inspiration.  Since Scripture and the 
Apostolic Church emerged from the same divine milieu, the Church must have something to say 
about Scripture‟s proper interpretation.  The final version of Dei Verbum shows some sympathy 
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to this conclusion.  It affirms, for instance, the organic interpenetration of Scripture and 
Traditions. The two sources of revelation, “flowing out from the same divine wellspring, in a 
certain way come together into a single current and tend toward the same end.”108  On the other 
hand, Dei Verbum received diversely Rahner‟s proposal that Tradition represented the Church‟s 
infallible interpretation of Scripture. It clearly affirmed that ecclesial tradition had an interpretive 
function,
109
 but—in order to avoid acrimonious debate—refused to decide whether tradition had 
an exclusively interpretive function, that is, whether tradition contained material content not 
found in Scripture.
110
  Dei Verbum was not therefore a wholesale endorsement of Rahner‟s 
thoughts on inspiration. 
[IV] Lohfink’s Critically-Correlative Inerrancy 
 
One notable lacuna in Rahner‟s treatment of inspiration was the matter of inerrancy.  The few 
hints that he did drop on this subject pointed to a propositional theory of inerrancy little different 
from that of Divino Afflante.
111
  It fell to N. Lohfink, Rahner‟s German Jesuit confrère, to 
develop a hermeneutic of inerrancy adequate to an “ecclesial-predefinitive” model of 
inspiration.
112
  In his influential essay, “The Inerrancy of Scripture,” Lohfink presumes the 
nearly unanimous verdict of 20
th
 Century exegesis: most books of the Bible are “curated” texts.  
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Books were produced by an anonymous and “organic” process: each new author reinterpreted 
previous versions in such wise that stable meaning belonged only to the final product.
113
  Not 
even individual books could be considered a stand-alone bearers of meaning.  The fact that each 
book was situated in a complex web of allusions and cross-references suggests that the ancient 
authors both wrote and read the bible within the “analogia scripturae—within the unity and 
meaning of the whole scripture.”114  And each new addition to the canon so altered the meaning 
of the parts as to be “equivalent to an act of authorship.”115   
From his observations on layered authorship, Lohfink could better show how the Church 
played a role even in the inspiration of the Old Testament.  The German Biblicist defines 
authorship broadly enough that the Church‟s decision to read the Old Testament with 
“christological intention,” along with her decision to expand the Old Testament with 
Christological writings, could be considered acts of authorship par excellence.
116
  Lohfink puts 
the matter somewhat provocatively when he quips that, “in the sense of the dogmatic doctrine of 
inspiration the New Testament was one of the „sacred writers‟ of the Old Testament.”117  Here 
Lohfink seems to assume Rahner‟s notion of an ecclesial “consciousness” and his distinction 
between Apostolic and post-Apostolic Church.  However, his notion of layered authorship 
suggests how the Church could become “author” of a text that antedated it without thereby 
approving a “work of simple human industry.”  Because the apostolic Church represented more 
than a “work of simple human industry,” the same would go for the works that it authored—
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including the Old Testament.  The Old Testament was not just destined for the Church, it was 
authored by her.         
From his observations on cumulative textual meaning, Lofhink concludes that we need 
not assign inspiration or inerrancy to any single author (who is but a layer of the redactive 
process anyway), nor even to single books, but only to the Bible read as a whole.
118
  In this 
connection, Lohfink notes that too many interpreters confuse the exegete‟s literal sense, which 
usually refers to “transitory layers of meaning of the Old Testament,” with the theologian‟s 
literal sense, which refers to “nothing other than the meaning of Scripture read as a whole and in 
the analogia fidei.”119  According to Lohfink, the Church holds only the theologian‟s literal sense 
inerrant. 
Of course, there are no wholes without parts.  Hence, the layers of meaning intended by 
individual authors are not to be “wholly rejected,” but must be “critically related to the whole” in 
such wise that they are “restored to a real significance in the light of the whole.”120  Lohfink 
advises his reader to keep this hermeneutic in mind when evaluating such phenomena as holy 
wars, imprecatory psalms, the concentration of Israel‟s hope on immanent salvation, the 
primitive cosmology of Genesis 1, and anachronisms in Joshua‟s campaign against Jericho.  We 
must identify the core, inerrant assertion of each passage by bearing in mind the book‟s end and 
the whole religious trajectory of God‟s People.  In this way the supervenience of ecclesial self-
expression upon personal self-expression, first proposed in Rahner‟s inspiration theory, is 
transposed into a hermeneutical method.   
[IV.2] Advantages 
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The obvious advantage of Lohfink‟s account was its ability to account plausibly for two sets of 
data: historical and doctrinal.  On historical end, Lohfink‟s method of critical correlation does 
not make the hagiographer‟s intention the ultimate arbiter of the literal sense.  This holistic 
approach to the literal sense was more palatable to practitioners of scientific exegesis, who were 
keenly aware that the concepts “author” and “book” were not as a controllable as was once 
thought.  On the doctrinal end, several things could be said in Lohfink‟s favor.  Respecting the 
multiple condemnations of the biblical encyclicals, Lohfink does not divide Scripture 
quantitatively into “sacred” and “profane” truths or into inerrant and fallible passages.  Rather, 
he submits biblical assertions of every kind to “critical correlation.”  Furthermore, by 
commending critical correlation, Lohfink can plausibly claim to be respecting both 
hermeneutical principles outlined in Dei Verbum: 1) the interpreter must search out “what 
meaning that the sacred writer … intended to express and did in fact express with the help of 
literary forms that were in use during that time”; and 2) the interpreter must pay “no less serious 
attention to the content and unity of the whole of Scripture, taking into account the entire living 
tradition of the Church and the analogy of faith.”121  Finally, Lohfink presents a way of linking 
the Church and Scripture without slighting the inspiration of Old Testament.     
Though Lohfhink admits that his theory exhibits a certain “novelty” vis-à-vis the biblical 
magisterium of the twentieth century,
122
 he nonetheless considers himself to have departed only 
from its implicit assumptions rather than its explicit doctrinal definitions.  Regarding the 
orthodoxy of his project, Lohfhink writes: “As with the first attempt at a solution, it necessarily 
departs from the underlying assumptions and from the language used in the older teaching 
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documents of the Church, but it thereby safeguards their actual doctrine.”123  In contrast to 
official documents, the German biblicist speaks of inerrant texts rather than inerrant authors.  
Moreover, he cleanly distinguishes between the “theological” literal sense and the intention of a 
particular historical author.  The former becomes something of a moving target, discernible only 
in “con-tuition” with the complex whole of Scripture.  As a result, Lohfink can propose a new 
method for qualifying inerrancy.  This method no longer turns on reconstructing the diverse 
mental postures its original authors, but on attending to a given passage‟s standing within the 
canonical whole.  He suggests, in fact, that Church has already countenanced a great deal 
“critical correlation”—albeit under the approved titles of form and genre criticism.124  Perhaps 
for these reasons Lohfink‟s theory met with a generally sympathetic hearing, both among 
theologians critical of Benoit‟s theory and among certain Bishops at Vatican II.125  Nevertheless, 
it seems to have arrived too late to affect the formulations of the council. 
Conclusion 
The theological treatment of inerrancy between Vatican I and Vatican II was dominated by both 
the conclusions and assumptions of the prophetic-instrumental model.  The important conclusion 
was that Scripture was unfailingly inerrant in its literal sense, provided, of course, that one 
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understood the literal sense as what the hagiographer properly intended to affirm and 
communicate.  The most important assumptions were 1) that inspiration was a charism of divine 
influence upon individual minds and 2) that inerrancy was a property of discrete, authorial 
judgments.  The Thomist model was for the most part presupposed in magisterial 
pronouncements of the 20
th
 Century.   
In attempts to draw out the genuinely human and communal dimensions of biblical 
composition, Rahner developed his neo-Molinist model.  He distinguished Scripture and the 
Church‟s dogmatic tradition in order to unite them more closely, and did so by arguing that God 
was true auctor of Scripture by being, in the first place, true auctor of the Apostolic Church, to 
whose faith Scripture serves as a permanent literary monument.  Lofhink supplemented this 
inspiration theory with a critically-correlative model of Scripture‟s literal sense and its inerrancy.  
Although these models perhaps had a restraining influence on the formulae of Vatican II, they 
were not yet sufficiently mature to assist the council Fathers in reframing the questions of 
inspiration and inerrancy.   
 As we shall see, Ratzinger is much closer to the models of inspiration and inerrancy 
proposed by Rahner and Lohfink, than he is to the models proposed by Benoit.  Though 
Ratzinger reaches similar conclusions, he does so from a different theoretical point of 
departure—one which we would characterize as “Bonaventurean-traditionary-dialogical.” 
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Chapter 2 
 
 Ratzinger on Inspiration 
 
Typologies, even if they do not capture every nuance of an author‟s theology, can be useful for 
situating him or her within a broader theological conversation.  Until now, we have been using 
tripartite nomenclature to evoke the major contours of inspiration:  the first term designating the 
theological “muse,” a second term designating the sacred author‟s primary function, and a third 
term designating the model of divine-human interaction.  Accordingly, we characterized Benoit‟s 
theory of inspiration (along with that of the early 20
th
 Century Magisterium) as Thomist, 
prophetic, and instrumental; and Rahner‟s as Molinist, authorial, and predefinitive.  In keeping 
with this scheme, we would characterize Ratzinger‟s understanding of inspiration—not unjustly, 
it is hoped—as Bonaventurean, traditionary, and dialogical.   
This typology will, of course, want some unpacking.  First, we will briefly recap 
Ratzinger‟s Bonaventurean ressourcement in four points.  Secondly, using an address that 
Ratzinger delivered in his capacity as peritus to Cardinal Frings at the Second Vatican Council, 
we will show how these four Bonaventurean points become the basis for Ratzinger‟s critique of 
the neo-Scholastic treatments of revelation and Scripture.  Third, after having surveyed 
Ratzinger‟s archaeological and critical phase, we will discuss his attempt at constructive 
aggiornamento.  In this phase we will elaborate how Ratzinger attempts to remedy the alleged 
four-fold deficiency of the prophetic-instrumental model of inspiration by recourse to a 
traditionary anthropology, an anthropology that understands God, history, and community to be 
deeply etched upon human interiority.  Finally, we will conclude with some reflections on 
Ratzinger‟s achievement and with a brief comparison to Benoit and Rahner. 
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 Through such an exposition we hope to show that Ratzinger understands “inspiration” to 
be more or less coterminous with sacred tradition, perhaps with the qualification that 
“inspiration” seems to be sacred tradition viewed from a certain angle—i.e., Scriptural 
production and interpretation.  As this brief definition already suggests, Ratzinger uses 
“inspiration” in a sense at once stipulative and broad.  Inspiration and tradition operate along the 
whole length of salvation history.  Hence, a comprehensive treatment of inspiration as Ratzinger 
defines it would also include the history of Scripture in the life of the Church, that is, a treatment 
of dogma and its development.  Such a treatment would take us far afield.  Hence, we will limit 
our exposition, insofar as possible, to field of inspiration as more commonly defined, that is, to 
the nature and function of inspiration up to the close of the scriptural canon. 
[I] Ressourcement and Critique 
 
By his own appraisal, Ratzinger owes his fundamental insight into the relation between Scripture 
and revelation to his early encounter with Bonaventure, on whose theology of history he wrote 
his Habilitationschrift.  In sketching the “essence of his thoughts” on the heated debates at the 
Second Vatican Council over the proper relation between Scripture, revelation, and tradition, 
Ratzinger recalls the new perspective that his medieval research had furnished:   
 Revelation, which is to say, God‟s approach to man, is always greater than what can be 
contained in human words, greater even than the words of Scripture.  As I have already 
said in connection with my work on Bonaventure, both in the Middle Ages and at Trent it 
would have been impossible to refer to Scripture simply as „revelation‟, as is the normal 
linguistic usage today.  Scripture is the essential witness of revelation, but revelation is 
something alive, something greater and more: proper to it is the fact that it arrives and is 
perceived—otherwise it could not become revelation… Revelation has instruments; but it 
is not separable from the living God, and it always requires a living person to whom it is 
communicated.  Its goal is always to gather and to unite men, and this is why the Church 
is a necessary aspect of revelation… And what we call “tradition” is precisely that part of 
revelation that goes above and beyond Scripture and cannot be comprehended with a 
code of formulas.
126
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As we shall see, without using so many words, Ratzinger is here elaborating his own theory of 
“inspiration.”  We have it from Ratzinger‟s pen that Bonaventure stimulated his thinking on 
matters of revelation, Scripture, and tradition; and that his own thinking had matured to stable 
conviction by the time of the Council.  These reasons alone, perhaps, justify a brief review of 
Ratzinger‟s research on the Seraphic Doctor and of his matching, conciliar critique.   
[I.1] Bonaventure 
 
In Ratzinger‟s Habilitation research, we find several keys to unlocking Ratzinger‟s later thought 
on inspiration: namely, the 1) living, 2) mystical, 3) ecclesial, and 4) historical character of 
inspiration according to the Seraphic Doctor.  Though he fourfold enumeration is more mine 
than Ratzinger‟s, it serves the interest of clarity to present them in this order.     
Living: Ratzinger arrived at his aforementioned conclusion—namely, the vital and 
transcendent quality of revelation—by careful attention to the Seraphic Doctor‟s terminology.  
He noticed, for instance, that Bonaventure tended to speak of “revelations” (revelationes) rather 
than “revelation” in its totality (revelatio).127  In another pre-modern quirk, the Seraphic Doctor 
employed the terms “inspiration,” “revelation,” and “prophecy” more or less interchangeably.128  
This contrasted with the later neo-Thomist habit of distinguishing inspiratio as lumen for 
                                                                                                                                                             
century) there was nothing corresponding to our concept of “revelation”, by which we are normally in the habit of 
referring to all the revealed contents of the faith: it has even become part of linguistic usage to refer to Sacred 
Scripture simply as “revelation”.  Such an identification would have been unthinkable in the language of the High 
Middle Ages.  Here, “revelation”, is always a concept denoting an act.  The word refers to the act in which God 
shows himself, not to the objectified result of this act.  And because this is so, the receiving subject is always also 
part of the concept of “revelation”.  Where there is no one to perceive “revelation”, no re-vel-ation has occurred, 
because no veil has been removed.  By definition, revelation requires a someone who apprehends it.  Because, if 
Bonaventure is right, then revelation precedes Scripture and becomes deposited in Scripture but is not simply 
identical with it.  This in turn means that revelation is always something greater than what is merely written down.  
And this again means that there can be such thing as sola scriptura (“by Scripture alone”), because an essential 
element of Scripture is the Church as understanding subject, and with this the fundamental sense of Tradition is 
already given” [ibid., 108-109]. 
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practical judgment, revelatio as speculative intellect‟s supernatural species, and full-blown 
prophecy as their compresence.  Ratzinger‟s hunch that neo-scholastic revelatio and 
Bonaventurean revelatio did not entirely coincide was confirmed by a third anomaly usage: 
revelatio also referred to the spiritual interpretation of Scripture.  From these clues Ratzinger 
inferred that, for Bonaventure, that “which truly constitutes revelation is accessible in the word 
written by the hagiographer, but… it remains to a degree hidden behind the words and must be 
unveiled anew.”129  Inspiration represented both the power by which divine meaning was 
inserted into human language and the power by which this divine meaning was re-actualized for 
interpreters of every generation.  Just as creating and preserving in being are but different aspects 
of same divine power, so are composing and receiving Scripture but different aspects of aspects 
of the same revelatio-inspiratio.   
On the basis of such terminological observations, Ratzinger reached his main conclusions 
regarding Bonaventure‟s notion of revelatio-inspiratio.  Perhaps most importantly, revelation 
exists for Bonaventure only in actu, only in the personal exchange between God as revealer and 
human person as receiver.  This being the case, it follows that a properly disposed, “receiving 
subject” belongs by definition to the concepts inspiratio-revelatio.  Scripture as text can 
therefore be reckoned only a partial condition for revelatio, not revelatio itself.  Ratzinger sums 
up, “Only Scripture understood in faith is truly Holy Scripture.”130   
 Mystical: On Ratzinger‟s reading of Bonaventure, Scripture owes its living and actual 
character to its origin in the “mystical contact of the hagiographers with God.”131 The great 
Franciscan describes the mystical quality of revelation from various angles: as the reception of a 
visio intellectualis, as the insight of a “mind illuminated by the Spirit of God” (mens Dei spiritu 
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illuminata)
132, as the “penetration through the peripheral-sensible to the spiritual and real.”133  
Since the hagiographers wrote on the basis of such a mystical insight, and since such insight was 
of its very nature partially ineffable, they could only try to “wrap it in the „swaddling clothes‟ of 
the written word.”134  Noteworthy in this regard is that Bonaventure locates divine-human 
cooperation more in the hagiographer‟s mystical receptivity rather than in his instrumental 
subordination.  In keeping with his mystical bent, Bonaventure stresses the distance between the 
spiritual content and the verbal content of Scripture.  The gap falls between the divine mind and 
the human minds, as well as between the illumined human mind and the language it employs. 
Ecclesial: At the same time, Ratzinger is keenly aware that Bonaventure, by making 
reception a constitutive element of revelation and inspiration, risks dissolving the objectivity of 
faith into a brine of subjective actualizations.
135
  Ratzinger anticipates this objection by showing 
that, for the latter, a true understanding of revelatio “demands the attitude of faith by which man 
gains entrance into the living understanding of Scripture in the Church.  It is in this way that man 
truly receives „revelation‟.”136  In keeping with this ecclesial attitude, Bonaventure presented the 
Symbola of the Catholic faith as basic principles of exegesis,
137
 and treated the Fathers as 
“inspired” interpreters, apart from whom one could not approach Holy Scripture.138  
Bonaventure, in other words, never entertained the idea of private faith.  And though “mere faith 
is only the lowest level of such a mystical penetration into Scripture,” it was nonetheless the 
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foundation for any future progress.
139
  Scripture, in sum, is unveiled only to those who have 
internalized the faith of the Church, the “objective” subject of revelation.  
 Historical: Up until this point, Ratzinger sees himself pitting the approach of both 
Bonaventure and the “historical” Thomas, on the one hand, over against that of the neo-
Thomists.
140
  However, Ratzinger indicates that Bonaventure parts company with even the 
historical Aquinas on one significant point—the theological significance of time and history.  
“For Aristotle and Thomas, time was a neutral measure of duration, an „an accident of 
movement.‟”141  Consequently, history remains “the realm of chance.  It cannot be treated in a 
truly scientific manner not only because of the mystery of human freedom that is at work in 
history, but because history as such belongs to the realm of accidentally ordered causality found 
in created things.”142  
 “For Bonaventure,” on the other hand, “time was “not merely a measure of change.”143  It 
was, rather, “one of the four structural elements from which the world was built.”144  Ratzinger 
considers Bonaventure‟s construal of time and history more thoroughly Christian: “With keen 
perception, Bonaventure sees that this concept of history is incompatible with the Christian 
view… For him, the world is ordered in an egressus and a regressus; in the center of these stands 
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Christ.”145  If Christ came in the “fullness of time,” then history must be ordered toward some 
fulfillment in Him.
146
 
The relevance of history to theological method thus becomes clear.  If time is a 
“structural element” of an intelligible world, then history can be intelligible as well.  It can, in 
other words, constitute “structural element” of theology.  And if Christ fulfills history, then to 
plumb the intelligible order of history is also to plumb the depths of Christ.   
These four points gathered from the Seraphic Doctor—revelation‟s vitality and 
unobjectifiability, its mystical provenance, its ecclesial orientation, and its historicity—all 
become deep wells from which Ratzinger would later draw.  
[I.2] Critique of Neo-Scholastic Models of Inspiration at Vatican II 
 
These four “planks” form the platform, in fact, from which Ratzinger would criticize the 
treatments of inspiration standard before the Second Vatican Council.  On the eve of the 
Council‟s opening, Cardinal Frings of Cologne invited the young professor at Bonn to address 
the bishops of the German speaking world.  Ratzinger offered a preliminary evaluation of De 
Fontibus Revelationis, the draft of the Schema on Divine Revelation prepared by the Preparatory 
Theological Commission for discussion on the council floor.
147
  He raised two major concerns: 
first, the schema‟s strict identification of Scripture with revelation was hardly traditional and, 
therefore, hardly required by orthodoxy; second, the schema‟s presentation of the inspiration 
process was more pagan than Christian.  Faced with these misgivings, he advised against binding 
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the whole Church, via conciliar definition, to what was really rather recent and rather mediocre 
textbook theology.
148
   
 Explaining his first concern, Ratzinger noted that De Fontibustended instead to identify 
“revelation with its material principles” rather than present it as a living reality.149  Ratzinger was 
here referring to the tendency to think of revelation as fund of propositional truths.  Under this 
model of revelation, Scripture served largely as a cache of revealed premises for later doctrinal 
deductions.  When dogmas turned out not to be deducible from Scripture alone, appeal was made 
to tradition—conceived as “a series of affirmations being passed on alongside Scripture” 150—in 
order to supply the missing premises.  This became known as the partim-partim theory, since 
revealed data points were contained partly in Scripture and partly in tradition.  While sharing the 
same informational model of revelation, an opposing camp championed the totum-totum theory 
of the Tübingen Dogmatiker J. R. Geiselmann.  This latter theory presented revelation—
understood in the same propositional manner—as present wholly in Scripture and wholly in 
tradition.  Catholic theologians opposed it for understandable reasons: if Scripture enjoys 
“material completeness” in matters of faith, ecclesial tradition becomes superfluous.  Luther 
wins.
151
 
Ratzinger advised against enshrining either approach in De Fontibus, and this for three 
main reasons.  First, neither approach was historically plausible.  With respect to the partim-
partim theory, there is “no affirmation that is not found in Scripture but can be traced back with 
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any historical probability to the time of the Apostles.”152  With respect to the totum-totum theory, 
many dogmas proved impossible to demonstrate on the basis of historically probable 
interpretations of Scripture.  Second, it was unnecessary.  If one simply grants that, with respect 
to Scripture, “revelation is prior and greater, then there is no trouble in having only one material 
principle, which even so is still not the whole, but only the material principle of the superior 
reality revelation, which lives in the Church.”153  Presumably,154 the emergence of new dogmas 
would be explained as judgments made in the living faith of the Church.  Third, as Ratzinger 
discovered in preparing his Habilitationschrift, the teaching was not traditional.  As it stood, De 
Fontibus would  
not only condemn Geiselmann but as well most of the Fathers and the classical scholastic 
theologians, beginning with Thomas Aquinas and Bonaventure. But that should not 
happen. One cannot in the name of tradition condemn as wrong the largest and most 
venerable part of the tradition.
155
 
 
Ratzinger proposed, as an alternative to both the (historically untenable) partim-partim theory 
and the (crypto-Protestant) totum-totum theory, what he considered the perennial tradition: 
namely, “that the three realities, Scripture, Tradition, and the Church‟s magisterium, are not 
static entities placed beside each other, but have to be seen as the one living organism of the 
Word of God.”156  In doing so, he brings Bonaventure‟s idea of revelation as a “living” and 
superior reality to bear on a contemporary quaestio disputata.    
With respect to his second concern, the proposed schema‟s account of the process of 
scriptural inspiration, Ratzinger cautioned that it risked canonizing a purely neo-Platonic theory 
of inspiration, a theory that Augustine borrowed uncritically from Philo.  This Philonian (read: 
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neo-Scholastic) theory of inspiration came up short in three—typically Bonaventurean—
respects.  First, being “based on the Greek mysticism of identity, it assumes that the divinity 
wholly overpowers the human person.”157  Ratzinger felt that the schema could not help but give 
the impression of coercion so long as it spoke of the hagiographer as “organon and 
instrumentum.”158  Ratzinger seems to oppose chiefly the instrumental (as opposed to the 
prophetic) aspect of neo-Thomist inspiration theory.  Second, the Bavarian peritus observed that 
a “timeless divine dictation theory” inevitably conceives the process of inspiration a-historically.  
Stenographic inspiration is more characteristic of the non-Christian religions, “whereas the Bible 
is the result of God's historical dialogue with human beings and only from this history does it 
have meaning and significance.”159  Here we can see Ratzinger‟s attentiveness to the historical 
dimension and even historical growth of revelatio (as reception).  Third, it follows that, once the 
historical dimension of inspiration is taken seriously, the hagiographer can exercise his function 
only within the Church.  The inspired author “is certainly God's „organ‟, but he is this at a quite 
definite place in history, that is, only by being at the same time „organ‟ of the Body of Christ and 
of the people of God in their covenant with God.”160  Here Ratzinger already hints at what he 
will affirm more explicitly in later writings, i.e., that the influence of the community extends 
even to the interior of the inspired author, to the depth where he interacts with God.  Ratzinger 
recapitulates the three elements in this way: “An inspiration doctrine developed from what is 
properly Christian embraces these basic categories: the person, whom God calls personally, not 
as an «organ», and takes into his service; history; and the people of God.”161 
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In the foregoing exposition of Ratzinger‟s research on Bonaventure and his early critique 
of neo-Scholastic theories of inspiration, we find the cornerstones upon which he constructs his 
theological edifice.  His four desiderata seem to be the living and transcendent nature of 
revelation as compared to written Scripture, the personal freedom and vocation of the 
hagiographer, the historical dimension of the process of inspiration, and the organic 
interpenetration of hagiographer and community.  It is worth noting that only the latter three 
correspond to traditional subject areas of treatises on “inspiration,” which described the process 
by which biblical texts were produced rather than as the ongoing process by which they are 
received and vivified.   
[II] Constructive Aggiornamento  
  
Not content simply to snipe at deficient theories, Ratzinger himself began to develop a model of 
Scriptural inspiration responsive to the defects indicated above.  At the heart of this project is 
what we would call a “traditionary” anthropology, a vision of the human person as a thoroughly 
relational, historical, and communal being.  When the traditionary person encounters God in a 
privileged way, sacred tradition is born.  Tradition depends in its turn upon a trans-generational 
community, from whom and to whom a vision of life can be transferred.  For Ratzinger, 
inspiration is more or less co-extensive with sacred tradition in this broader sense,
162
 and its 
communal bearer is the Church.   
We will thus treat the topics in the order suggested above.  First, we will begin with an 
exposition of Ratzinger‟s traditionary anthropology.  Second, we will describe how the influence 
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of revelatio elevates human tradition to the level of sacred tradition and, thereby, to the level of 
inspiration.  Third, we will explore how the Catholic Church serves as the “subject” or “agent” of 
inspiration and tradition.  Along the way, we intend to show how Ratzinger‟s treatment addresses 
his aforementioned desiderata.            
[II.1] Traditionary Anthropology 
 
The key to Ratzinger‟s constructive project turns out to be his personalist anthropology, which—
in contrast to “substantialist” anthropologies—underscores the open, historical, and relational 
character of the human person.  As well shall see, the Ratzingerian person does not just engage 
in dialogue and have relations; he is dialogue; he is relation.  This relativity extends in both 
vertical and horizontal directions, with the vertical serving as the foundation for the horizontal.  
In the vertical direction, we detect a certain desire to rethink the “higher” faculties of the 
human person in biblical and personalist terms.  Ratzinger declines, for instance, to be guided by 
the Aristotelian definition of the human person as a “rational animal,” or by the careful 
distinction of the human spirit—characteristic of Benoit‟s rational psychology—into speculative 
and practical intellect.  For Ratzinger, the specific difference lies more in the human person‟s 
capacity for relationship with God:   
The distinguishing mark of man, seen from above, is his being addressed by God, the fact 
that he is God‟s partner in a dialogue, the being called by God.  Seen from below, this 
means that man is the being that can think of God, the being opened on to 
transcendence.
163
 
  
In proposing this relational anthropology, Ratzinger sees himself taking seriously the biblical 
teaching that the human person is created ad imaginem Dei and, therefore, ad imaginem 
Trinitatis.  Reflecting on the traditional definition of Trinitarian persons as “subsistent relations,” 
Ratzinger draws the anthropological conclusions: 
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I believe a profound illumination of God as well as man occurs here, the decisive 
illumination of what person must mean in terms of Scripture: not a substance that closes 
itself in on itself, but the phenomenon of complete relativity, which is, of course, realized 
in its entirety only in the one who is God, but which indicates the direction of all personal 
being.
164
 
 
Ratzinger does not allege that there is no place for the category of relatio in “substantialist” 
philosophy.  He merely finds its importance underplayed: “To Aristotle [relatio] was among the 
„accidents‟, the chance circumstances of being, which are separate from substance, the sole 
sustaining form of the real.”165  In the Trinity, by contrast, relatio is “equally primordial.”166   
And only the Trinity can inspire a truly Christian vision of the human person. 
Ratzinger is aware that such an anthropology of “complete relativity” butts up against 
even some of the most venerable phrases of Christian anthropology.   Even the notion of “soul” 
needs to be rethought: “What we call in substantialist language „having a soul‟ will be described 
in a more historical, actual language as „being God‟s partner in dialogue‟”167  And though he 
does not consider such attributes as “immortal soul” simply false, he doubts that they can finally 
“do justice to the dialogic and personalistic view of the Bible.”168  In proposing the dialogical 
soul, Ratzinger affirms both the transcendence of the human person above the material world and 
the reality of the personal encounter with God, but does so in relational rather than 
“substantialist” categories.     
But the human person is not just vertical, spiritual transcendence.  Even though the anima 
“goes beyond this world in going beyond itself,” it is no less true that the soul “belongs 
completely to the material world.”169  And, if to the material world, then it belongs to the 
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historical and communal world as well; for “existence in a corporal form necessarily also 
embraces history and community, for if pure spirit can be thought of as existing strictly for itself, 
corporality implies descent from another: human beings live and depend in a very real and at the 
same time very complex sense on one another.”170  Neither pure matter nor pure spirit exhibits 
such interdependence, but only embodied spirits. It is this intersection of vertical and horizontal 
transcendence makes “tradition” possible.   
In uncovering the precise meaning of tradition, Ratzinger adverts to the historical and 
communal dimensions of reason—most evident in the human capacity for memory and speech.  
He contends that the point of contrast between animals and humans—turning as it does on the 
historical and social texture of human intellect—is subtler than has often been supposed.  
Ratzinger cites studies showing that certain primates also show a capacity for problem solving 
and “invention”; what they lack, as compared with humans, is the ability to hand on these 
“inventions” from one generation to the next.  As it turns out, the element distinctive to the 
human spirit is not so much inventiveness as memory, a “context that fosters unity beyond the 
limits of the present moment.”171  By its transtemporal transcendence, memory makes tradition 
possible:   
…The most distinctive characteristic of tradition is, in fact, the ability to recognize my 
now as significant also for the tomorrow of those who come after me and, therefore, to 
transmit to them for tomorrow what has been discovered today.  On the other hand, a 
capacity for tradition means preserving today what was discovered yesterday, in that way 
forming the context of a way through time, shaping history.  This means that tradition 
properly understood is, in effect, a transcendence of today in both directions.
172
 
 
As the importance of memory suggests, human reason always has an historical dimension.  
Reason carries within itself a reference to past, present, and future. 
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Speech, for its part, mirrors the historical dynamic of memory and completes it.  Like 
memory, speech suggests the way in which history comes to mark even the inner life of the 
human person.  Ratzinger muses that our 
mental life depends entirely on the medium of language, and … language was not 
invented today.  It comes from a long way off; the whole of history has contributed to it 
and through it enters into us as the unavoidable premise of our present, indeed as a 
constant part of it.
173
 
  
Speech parallels memory by its trans-temporal continuity, that is, by “faithfully preserving the 
past and … by understanding this past in a new way in light of present experiences and thus 
facilitating man‟s advance into the future.”174  Speech completes memory, however, by adding 
“communicability,” an element essential to tradition.175  Only through speech can private 
memories become communal traditions, and only together can “memory and speech offer a 
model of the relationship of tradition and time.”176   
 From these reflections on speech, memory, history and tradition, the extent to which the 
human person depends upon the community becomes clear.  “Tradition,” says Ratzinger, 
“requires a subject in whom to adhere, a bearer, whom it finds (not only, but basically) in a 
linguistic community…  [Tradition] is possible only because many subjects become, as it were, 
one subject in the context of a common heritage.”177  If tradition can survive only in a linguistic 
community, and if the inner life of the human person rests on tradition and language, it follows 
that the human person cannot fully awaken to his own humanity except through others and in 
community.  Ratzinger quotes the great Tübingen theologian A. Möhler in this connection:  
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“Man, as a being set entirely in a context of relationship, cannot come to himself by himself, 
although he cannot do it without himself either.”178   
 The four Bonaventurean qualities of revelatio, which reappeared as four desiderata for 
Schema on Divine Revelation, thus find a sort of Anknupfungspunkt in human tradition.  In 
locating the divine-human dialogue at the core of human existence, Ratzinger already provides 
the basis for human person‟s openness to revelation—a living and conceptually inexhaustible 
reality.   This, in turn, paves the way for a personal and mystical approach to divine-human 
cooperation.  At the same time, by stressing the “corporality”—i.e., the communal and historical 
stamp—of the human spirit, Ratzinger suggests the mechanism by which divine inspiration can 
become a phenomenon both historical and ecclesial.     
[II.2] Inspiration as Sacred Tradition  
   
Having surveyed Ratzinger‟s traditionary anthropology, we are now in a position to see why he 
can present inspiration as but a special case of tradition.  Sacred traditions emerge more or less 
when the divine-human dialogue, present to some degree in every person, finds privileged 
intensity in a charismatic individual.  Since such individuals are always socially embedded, their 
singular religious experience also becomes a treasure for the whole community.   
 Ratzinger tries to evoke the richness of religious experience through the personalist 
language of dialogue and encounter. Even though there is no dialogue without meaningful 
content,
179
 dialogue always conveys more—union, person, presence.  Commenting on the 
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“nature of revelation” in Dei Verbum §4, Ratzinger insists that “the purpose of this dialogue is 
ultimately not information, but unity and transformation.”180  Such encounters are always more 
an event of “relationship” and “encounter” than a “system of propositions.”181  And even if 
Christian faith includes and even depends upon linguistic formulations, “its central formula is not 
„I believe in something‟, but „I believe in thee‟.”182  Here we catch a glimpse of the supra-
conceptual fullness of revelation, to which only faith is adequate to respond. 
The very richness of the experience makes it an apt center of tradition.  Being partly 
ineffable, the content of the religious experience cannot be exhausted by any particular mode of 
expression or even the aggregate modes of expression of any particular generation.  New facets 
always emerge, and the tradition is thus renewed.  Moreover, even mystics, embedded as they 
are in the tissue of history and society, must draw from their own culture.  They take up the 
symbols and language both most familiar to them and least inadequate for expressing their 
religious experience, and—after enriching them with the depth of their vision—return them as a 
communal heritage.  The inexhaustible becomes at least partly accessible through this process.   
The renewability and communicability of breakthrough experiences becomes important 
in view of the rarity of the religious “talent.”  Ratzinger admits that, just as one meets people of 
diverse musical talent, so also  
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one meets people who are religiously „talented‟ and those who are „untalented‟; here too 
those capable of direct religious experience and thus of something like religious creativity 
are few and far between.  The „mediator‟ or „founder‟, the witness, the prophet, or 
whatever religious history likes to call such men, remains here too the exception.  Over 
against these few, for whom the divine thus becomes undisguised certainty, stand the 
many whose religious gift is limited to receptivity, who are denied the direct experience 
of the holy, yet are not so deaf to it as to be unable to appreciate an encounter with it 
through the medium of the man granted such an experience.
183
  
  
The religious level of whole communities is elevated by the religious life of charismatic 
individuals, who thus become fountainheads of sacred tradition.
184
  This sacred tradition 
originates in divine encounter, yet both draws from and enriches the language and symbols of the 
people to whom the original tradent belonged.  Since sacred tradition incrementally “divinizes” 
the language of a community, one can see how scriptural inspiration might be seen as a special 
case thereof. 
   Ratzinger is not without examples of this traditionary process.  As paradigm cases of 
religious “geniuses” who become sources of religious tradition, Ratzinger presents to us Adam, 
Abraham, and Jesus.
185
  Ratzinger almost treats Adam as a necessary deduction, as the 
mysterious primum mobile of the chain of tradition.  Presuming that the religious sense is 
epidemic among humanity, and presuming again that religious sensitivity spreads like a 
contagion from original carriers, the logical conclusion is that there must have been a first 
carrier—a first recipient of “primordial revelation”: 
Obviously [primordial revelation] cannot be just the transmission of the first man‟s 
fragmentary memory of a conversation with God.  If this were so, man‟s history would be 
quite different… From what has been said, we may conclude that the origin of 
“humanity” coincides in time with the origin of man‟s capacity for tradition.  Primordial 
revelation would mean, then, that there occurred in the formation of subjects who would 
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be bearers of tradition primordial realities that were beyond the native understanding of 
any individual but were open to new revelations experienced in obedience by the great 
patriarchs, by those great ones who kept themselves open to transcendence and assured 
its acceptance.
186
 
 
Ratzinger describes his deduction in a rather open way, without committing to an individual or 
collective interpretation of “Adam.”  In either event, religious sensibility represents one way in 
which each person “is deeply marked by his membership of the whole of mankind—the one 
„Adam‟.”187   
Among the “great patriarchs” who opened themselves to transcendence, Ratzinger singles 
out Abraham, whom he paints in the colors of a German Romantic poet.  
Abraham heard God‟s call, he enjoyed some kind of mystical experiences, a direct 
eruption of the divine, which pointed his way for him.  This man must have had 
something of the seer about him, a sensitivity to being, which enlarged his perception 
beyond the bounds of what is accessible to our senses.  This extension of the realm of 
perception, which men in all ages … have sought to acquire by artificial means, was 
obviously enjoyed by him, as by all religious geniuses, in a pure, effortless, and original 
manner.  He had a faculty for perceiving the divine.
188
 
 
Far from isolating Abraham in lonely splendor, his receptivity made him “father of his faithful 
posterity who from him and through him shared in this broadening of the horizon which was 
granted to him.”189  Israel, in other words, became the extension of “Abraham‟s sonship,”190 the 
bearer of his tradition.  And as the human source of this tradition, Abraham becomes one of the 
“inspired authors” of the Old Testament—even if he never picked up a pen.  
What holds for the first “Adam” and for Abraham holds a fortiori for Jesus, the “last 
Adam.”191  Jesus was not simply a tabula rasa; he stood downstream from Abraham, and “lived 
                                                 
186
 Ratzinger, Principles of Catholic Theology : Building Stones for a Fundamental Theology, 89. 
187
 Ratzinger, Introduction to Christianity, 184. 
188
 Ratzinger, Faith and the Future, 33-34. 
189
 ibid., 34. 
190
 Joseph Ratzinger, Many Religions, One Covenant : Israel, the Church, and the World (San Francisco, CA; San 
Francisco: San Francisco, CA : Ignatius Press, 1999), 27. 
191
 Ratzinger, Introduction to Christianity, 175. 
 55 
his religious life within the framework of the faith and tradition of God‟s people Israel.”192  
However, Jesus is more than a second Abraham.  His mission “consists of bringing together the 
histories of the nations in the community of the history of Abraham, the history of Israel.”193  
This higher and more universal mission becomes manifest in Jesus‟ treatment of tradition, 
toward which he waxes, by turns, both submissive and dismissive.  For Ratzinger, only “on the 
basis of his intimate communion with God” could Jesus claim the right both to affirm and 
critique his ancestral heritage:
194
  
… Both his freedom and his strictness proceed from a common source: from his prayerful 
intercourse with the Father, from his personal knowledge of God, on the basis of which 
he draws the dividing line between the center and the periphery, between the will of God 
and the work of man.
195
   
 
The Son does not simply design his own existence; he receives it in a most profound 
dialogue with God… It is this dialogue that teaches him, without school or teacher, to 
know Scripture more deeply than anyone else—to know it truly from God himself.196 
 
Only someone interpreting “with divine authority” could definitively discern between divine 
core and human accretion and, by such discernment, renew tradition without destroying it.
197
  By 
planting himself firmly in the great web of history and tradition, Jesus made his filial mysticism 
available to all who followed in his wake.  “Jesus has entered into the already existing subject of 
a tradition, God‟s People of Israel … and by doing so has made it possible for people to 
participate in his most intimate and personal act of being, i.e., his dialogue with the Father.”198  
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Christianity turns out then to be nothing other than participation, though sacred tradition, in the 
Christ‟s own divine sonship. 
The first Adam and the last Adam are the two truly universal religious “founders.”  
However, just as the patriarchs and prophets were able to access and rejuvenate the first Adam‟s 
primordial dialogue, so also subsidiary Christian “founders” (i.e., apostles and saints) are able to 
gain access to the “last” Adam‟s filial dialogue through the power of the Holy Spirit.  In both 
cases, tradition hands on personal reality in addition to words and symbols.
199
  It is within this 
broad delta of pneumatic and Christological tradition that Scripture has both emerged and been 
preserved as a portal for entering this divine-human dialogue.  Commenting on Dei Verbum §21, 
our author explains that the   
resonance of the voice of the apostles and prophets throughout Scripture is important to it 
because the voice itself resounds with the Holy Spirit, because in them we encounter the 
dialogue of God with men.  Thus the reference to the original colour of Scripture is 
placed in the context of the idea of dialogue, and the latter again is to be seen against the 
background of the original dialogue of the Spirit of God, which created men, with 
them.
200
   
  
Inspiration, then, is nothing other than a privileged dialogue with God that has become 
permanently accessible via sacred tradition.  Put another way, inspiration is nothing other than 
sacred tradition viewed from the angle of the production and interpretation of the canonical 
Scriptures.  
We find great consistency, then, between the theology of the later Ratzinger and the 
desiderata of the earlier Ratzinger.  The mystical origin of revelation in Bonaventure, becomes 
the dialogical origin of inspiration in Ratzinger.  The language of dialogue evokes the 
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interpersonal quality of revelation and its irreducibility to verbal formulae.  The analogical nature 
of religious language thus binds it to both community and history.  Since it is partly effable, 
religious writings can be passed on as the common heritage of a particular language group.  
However, since these writings point beyond themselves to the ineffable, they can be taken up 
anew by each successive generation without violating the meaning of the text.  And it is 
Ratzinger‟s reframing of inspiration as tradition that holds these transcendent, personal, 
historical and communal aspects together. 
[II.3] Inspiration as Ecclesial Tradition 
 
Ratzinger‟s traditionary theory of inspiration naturally opens new perspectives on the Church as 
well.  As the whole of humanity is, in one sense, the bearer of Adam‟s religious tradition, and as 
Israel is the bearer of Abraham‟s religious tradition, so is the Church (minimally) the bearer of 
Christ‟s tradition.  For Ratzinger, once tradition is properly understood, this claim is 
indisputable: 
Tradition, we said, always presumes a bearer of tradition, that is, a community that 
preserves and communicates it, that is a vessel of a comprehensive common tradition and 
that becomes, by the oneness of the historical context in which it exists, the bearer of 
concrete memory.  The bearer of tradition in the case of Jesus is the Church.  This is not a 
theological judgment in the true sense of the word but a simple statement of fact.  The 
Church‟s role as bearer of tradition rests on the oneness of the historical context and the 
communal character of the basic experiences that constitute the tradition.  This bearer is, 
consequently, the sine qua non of the possibility of a genuine participation in the traditio 
of Jesus, which, without it, would be, not a historical and history-making reality, but only 
a private memory.
201
 
 
The Church‟s status as bearer of Jesus‟ traditio already suggests her uniqueness among religious 
traditions.  For, to the degree that Jesus‟ intimacy with the Father surpasses that of the great 
patriarchs and other religious geniuses, to that same degree the tradition of the Church will 
surpass other great religious traditions.   
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Nevertheless, even to present the connection between Jesus and the Church as an instance 
of a general anthropological pattern, that is, as an example of the complex relationship between 
religious geniuses and their spiritual posterity, does not quite do justice to the depth of 
relationship between Christ and the Church.  By Ratzinger‟s own admission, presenting the 
Church as Christ‟s tradition in a sociological sense is not a “theological judgment in the true 
sense of the word but a simple statement of fact.”  If she were merely a curatrix of Christ‟s 
religious artifacts or repository of His historical memories, then the figure of Christ would be 
doomed to recede ever farther into the mists of the past.   
The Church must be “one subject,” therefore, in a more than sociological way.  She must 
receive her unity qua subject from Christ, with respect to whom she can possess only a relative 
autonomy.  Ratzinger drives this point home in his reflections on a famous Pauline metaphor: the 
Church as Christ‟s body.  In this metaphor,    
Paul does not say “as in an organism there are many members working in harmony, so 
too in the Church”, as if he were supposing an purely sociological model of the Church, 
but at the very moment when he leaves behind the ancient simile, he shifts the idea to an 
entirely new level.  He affirms, in fact, that, just as there is one body but many members, 
“so it is with Christ” (1 Cor 12:12).  The term of comparison is not the Church since, 
according to Paul, the Church is in no wise a separate subject endowed with its own 
subsistence.  The new subject is much rather “Christ” himself, and the Church is nothing 
but the space of this new unitary subject, which is, therefore, much more than social 
interaction.
202
  
 
The Church‟s existence is continuous with Christ‟s existence; and she is therefore subject in both 
a sociological and uniquely theological sense.  As a sociological subject she is historically bound 
to Christ, her charismatic founder.  As a theological subject, however, she is existentially united 
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to Christ, who remains ever alive and active in her.
203
  For Ratzinger, the “Church is that new 
and greater subject in which past and present, subject and object come into contact.  The Church 
is our contemporaneity with Christ: there is no other.”204   
Only when the Church is seen as a subject in both senses—as the sociological bearer of 
Christ‟s tradition and as the theological subject of His power and presence—does the proper 
relationship between Church and Scripture come to light.  The Church then becomes both a 
transcendent and historical “subject” of Scripture; she appears as something like a “traditionary 
person” writ large.  This is a point that Ratzinger returns to repeatedly form different angles.  
Sometimes he underscores the historical and sociological nature of this connection: “Scripture is 
one by reason of the historical subject that traverses it, the one people of God”;205 the Church is 
“the human subject (das menschliche Subjekt) of the Bible”;206 the “New Testament, as a book, 
presupposes the Church as its subject.”207  At other times Ratzinger stresses the transparency of 
the Church to the divine: the “Bible originates from one subject formed by the people of God 
and, through it, from the divine subject himself.”208 Most often Ratzinger uses the term to 
underscore the contemporary relevance of the Church for Scripture: the “Holy Scriptures come 
from a subject that is still very much alive—the Pilgrim People of God…”;209 Scripture arose 
“within the People of God guided by the Holy Spirit, and this people, this subject, has not ceased 
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to exist”;210 without this “surviving and living agent, the Church, Scripture would not be 
contemporary with us …”211  Examples could be multiplied. 
Ratzinger makes abundantly clear, at any rate, that the Church is the privileged venue for 
the interplay between Spirit and history and, therefore, the privileged locus of inspiration: 
At this point we get a glimmer, even on the historical level, of what inspiration means: 
The author does not speak as a private, self-contained subject.  He speaks in a living 
community, that is to say, in a living historical movement not created by him, nor even by 
the collective, but which is led forward by a greater power that is at work.
212
 
 
It is only at this point that we can begin to understand the nature of inspiration; we can 
see where God mysteriously enters into what is human and purely human authorship is 
transcended… Certainly Scripture carries God’s thoughts within it”; that makes it 
unique and constitutes its “authority”.  Yet it is transmitted by a human history.  It 
carries within it the life and thought of a historical society that we call the “People of 
God”, because they are brought together, and held together, by the coming of the divine 
word.  There is a reciprocal relationship: This society is the essential condition for the 
growth of the biblical Word; and, conversely, this Word gives the society its identity and 
its continuity.
213
 
 
Just as human tradition is both the receiving and the giving of memory and language, so is sacred 
tradition both the receiving and the transmission of sacred stories and sacred language.  The 
“memory” of sacred tradition is basically the living consciousness of the Church,214 and the 
“language” of sacred tradition is basically the canonical books.  Human tradition and inspiration 
are analogous. 
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 We see Ratzinger‟s four desiderata again well represented in his treatment of inspiration 
in the Church.  When he brings the historical and ecclesial dimension to the fore, the role of the 
individual hagiographer naturally occupies the background.  Nonetheless, Ratzinger never denies 
or even overlooks personal authorship.  Ratzinger also takes care to underscore the actuality and 
transcendence of revelation over its textual objectification, by insisting on the active presence of 
Christ in the Church and by describing a symbiosis between the Bible and its communal subject.   
[III] Concluding Remarks: Achievements and Comparisons 
 
Having outlined Ratzinger‟s presentation of inspiration as sacred tradition, we now hope to 
conclude with a brief assessment of Ratzinger‟s achievement and a few points of comparison 
with Rahner and Benoit.  Ratzinger‟s achievement is to have recast biblical inspiration, through 
both ressourcement and aggiornamento, in a way that is at once orthodox and plausible.  It 
would make most sense to organize our evaluation of his achievement according to his own 
criteria, the four desiderata he mentioned early in his career.   
1. Living: By showing that the Seraphic Doctor understood revelation to be not only a 
body of divinely revealed theses but also—and even primarily—a living reality, he could argue 
that orthodoxy did not require the thoroughgoing identification of revelation with propositional 
content.  Moreover, the priority and superiority of revelation over Scripture as written text gave 
Ratzinger a new way of conceiving tradition and Scripture: that is, as revelation‟s formal and 
material principle, respectively.  Extrapolating from Ratzinger‟s language a bit, we might say 
that Scripture and tradition supply, respectively, the “body” and “soul” for the living organism of 
revelation.  On this basis, one no longer need to suppose that the historically ascertainable 
meaning of Scripture was sufficient to ground every subsequent doctrine (pace Geiselmann); 
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nor, failing this, that a hypothetical collection of unwritten, apostolic premises could fill the gap 
(pace the neo-Scholastics).  Both approaches strained historical credibility. 
 Ratzinger‟s constructive formulation differs from Benoit‟s and Rahner‟s.  It contrasts 
most clearly with the former‟s informational definition of inspiration, that is, as a divine 
enlightenment of propositional judgment.  It does, however, have clear points of contact with 
Rahner‟s model, which likewise treats tradition as a vital principle rather than as a material 
principle.  Nonetheless, Rahner and Ratzinger arrive at the conclusion differently.  Rahner 
understood Scripture to be the only adequate objectification of the Church‟s primal 
consciousness, whereas Ratzinger understood Scripture as only the inadequate objectification of 
a privileged, personal dialogue with God.  In both cases, however, tradition becomes necessary 
for entry into an encompassing fullness—whether the fullness of the Church‟s primal 
consciousness (Rahner‟s take), or the fullness of a charismatic founder‟s relationship with God 
(Ratzinger‟s take).     
 2. Mystical:  Through his dialogical anthropology, Ratzinger is able to present inspiration 
as the non-competitive cooperation between divine and human wills.  Since the essence of the 
human soul is its being addressed by God, there is no question of God “intervening” where He 
was not previously.  Moreover, Ratzinger‟s tendency to link inspiration more closely to mystical 
dialogue allows him to portray the charism as a heightening of natural human capacities rather 
than their suppression.  The “hagiographer” comes off as more rather than less human.   
This approach differs from both Benoit and Rahner in three notable ways.  First, neither 
Benoit nor (perhaps) Rahner makes the psychological awareness of being inspired a condition 
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for inspiration.
215
  Ratzinger, on the other hand, places religious experience squarely at the heart 
of religious tradition and, therefore, at the heart of inspiration.    
Second, Ratzinger presents, on the whole, a more cooperative model of divine-human 
cooperation.  Though such a non-competitive concursus characterizes Thomist philosophy in 
general, it does not characterize the specific relationship between principal cause and 
instrumental cause, which served as the paradigm for the neo-Thomist treatment of inspiration.  
As Rahner points out, two causes cannot be authors of the whole of Scripture in the same 
respect.  Hence, on the instrumental model, the more one emphasizes true divine authorship, the 
less can one emphasize true human authorship.  It is true that Ratzinger and Rahner, share a 
common antipathy toward the model of instrumental causality, which they reject as menacing to 
human freedom.  Nonetheless, Rahner‟s appeal to “formal predefinition” already presupposes the 
competitive relationship between the divine will and human freedom characteristic of Molinism.  
“Formal predefinition” refers, after all, to the process by which God pre-arranges circumstances 
“from the outside,” as it were, so that the agent might freely and infallibly do God‟s will.  God‟s 
closeness is perhaps still seen to threaten human freedom.   
Third, because Ratzinger describes inspiration as a charism of mystical receptivity rather 
than as a charism of textual production, the term “hagiographer” fits Ratzinger‟s paradigm less 
than either Benoit‟s or Rahner‟s.  It is true that, on Ratzinger‟s model, mystical penetration gives 
rise to sacred tradition and then to sacred texts.  And it is also true that Benoit‟s later proposal of 
“analogies of inspiration” would accord a part-share in inspiration to all who contributed to the 
final text—whether by thought, word or deed.  Nonethless, for both Rahner and Benoit, the 
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paradigm case always remains the inspired writer—no matter how anonymous or obscure.  For 
Ratzinger, on the other hand, the paradigm case is the religious genius in whose traditionary 
stream the writers stand.  Using Rahner‟s terms, we might say that the model for divine-human 
synergy is not Verfasser-Verfasser (pace Benoit), nor Urheber-Verfasser (pace Rahner), but 
Urheber-Urheber.   
  One possible objection to Ratzinger‟s Urheber-Urheber model is that it seems to present 
inspiration as different in degree rather than in kind from other divine encounters: e.g., 
consolations in prayer, visions, locutions.  Is inspiration simply a very intense form of 
mysticism?  And, if such religious experiences continue, why should the canon not remain open?  
Ratzinger, following what he takes to be Bonaventure‟s position, upholds a qualitative difference 
between Scripture and all subsequent theologizing. He insists that  
the writers of Holy Scripture speak as themselves, as men, and yet, precisely in doing so, 
they are “theologoi”, those through whom God as subject, as the word that speaks itself, 
comes into history.  What distinguishes Holy Scripture from all later theology is thus 
completely safeguarded, but, at the same time, the Bible becomes the model of all 
theology, and those who are bearers of it become the norm of the theologian, who 
accomplishes has task properly only to the extent that he makes God himself his 
subject.
216
 
 
Ratzinger insists on the unique status of the writers of Holy Scripture, through whom God speaks 
as “subject.”  However, our author considers any person a theologian only “to the extent that he 
makes God himself his subject,” theologians come across as lower grade of hagiographer.  It 
would seem that God can become the subject of our language by degrees.  
Ratzinger‟s thoughts on this matter seem to run in different directions.  On the one hand, 
Ratzinger upholds the uniqueness of Scripture by strongly resisting the suggestion that its 
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language be updated in an ongoing process.
217
  Sacred tradition is no substitute for Scripture, but 
merely “interpretation „according to the Scriptures.‟”218  He grounds the permanence of 
Scriptures in “the concrete activity of God in this history and its historical uniqueness: the 
ἐυάπαξ, the „once only‟ aspect, which is just as essential to the reality of Christian revelation as 
the „forever‟.”219  The limited scope of the incarnation, in other words, correlates with the limited 
scope of the Church‟s canon.   
On the other hand, Ratzinger struggles to give an account of the qualitative difference 
between Scripture and Creed.  Ratzinger resists the movement to update hallowed creedal and 
dogmatic formulations, for example, no less vigorously than he resists scriptural paraphrasing.
220
  
Hence, one cannot point a difference of permanence.  Moreover, he characterizes even the 
“proclamation of Christ himself,” the ἐυάπαξ, as “fulfillment and thus as interpretation of 
something, though as authoritative interpretation, of course.”221  The interpreted itself turns out 
to be a kind of interpretation.  Consequently, when it comes to distinguishing between Scripture 
and ecclesial dogma, Ratzinger again presents a separation of degree: 
True, [the proclamation of the Church] too is not interpretation in the sense of mere 
exegetical interpretation, but in the spiritual authority of the Lord that is implemented in 
the whole of the Church‟s existence … Yet it does remain, far more than the Christ-event 
that founded the Church, interpretation, linked with what has happened and what has 
been spoken. 
222
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Does Ratzinger have any way of distinguishing more clearly between Scripture and doctrine?  
Perhaps so, but he is hard to pin down on this point.  
3. Historical: Ratzinger manages to incorporate historical consciousness rather 
seamlessly into his inspiration theory.  He does so by making history a dimension of reason—by 
presenting intellect basically as memory.  Hence, there can be no “timeless dictation theory” 
(pace Benoit) because there is no “timeless intellect” to receive such dictation.  Moreover, each 
“hagiographer” will be marked by a particular historical tradition, not just by “historicity” as a 
general category.   
This latter point separates Ratzinger subtly from Rahner.
223
  The latter admittedly 
emphasizes history as a general category when he emphasizes God‟s redemptive-historical acts 
of formal predefinition.  For only when such an influence operates “from a point of space and 
time in preference to any other” does the resultant work truly become God‟s own.224  Rahner, 
however, seems very little concerned with particular historical sphere in which the inspired 
authors moved.  We can see a different sensibility in Ratzinger, who presents Jesus as both the 
“inspired author” par excellence and as inwardly marked by the specific history and tradition of 
Israel.  It is Israel‟s history that Christ renews and universalizes.  By Christ‟s purifying re-
reading, Israel becomes the Church, and the Old Testament becomes “inspired.”  Rahner, by 
contrast, explains that the Old Testament is inspired by virtue of its being destined for 
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completion in the New Testament, not by virtue of its being the book of the people into which 
Christ was born. 
4. Communal: Finally, Ratzinger also manages to lay out the basis for a non-competitive 
relationship between the three great actors in the process of inspiration:  the “founder”, the 
community, and God.  Through language and culture, the community and (a fortiori) the Church 
are always already interior to the sacred “author.”  The hagiographer is an “anima 
ecclesiastica.”225  In the opposite direction, the most intimate dialogue with God takes on 
communal and ecclesial import when expressed in language or otherwise objectified.  On this 
basis, Ratzinger manages to present inspiration as a balanced interplay between the three 
interpenetrating agents mentioned above.  Perhaps because theology has emphasized for so long 
God‟s influence upon the mind of the individual authors, our author occasionally seems to slight 
the role of the “individual.”226  Nonetheless, and with growing clarity in his later writings, 
Ratzinger describes inspiration as a work resting upon the aforementioned tripod.
227
 
Again, we see obvious differences between Ratzinger and Benoit, on the one hand, and 
subtler differences between Ratzinger and Rahner on the other.  Benoit, being more concerned to 
show how God acts directly and non-coercively upon the psyche of the individual author, makes 
little reference to the Church‟s role in the process of inspiration.  Both agree that the Church is 
intrinsic to the process of inspiration and, therefore, that the Church has a unique and 
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sympathetic understanding of Scripture.  They differ, however, in their manner of relating the 
individual and the Church.  Rahner coordinates ecclesial and authorial consciousness by a sort of 
divine fiat, an act of formal predefinition arranging circumstances such that the human author 
freely aligns his vision with the Apostolic Church‟s.  Ratzinger, by contrast, presents the “We” 
of the Church as already interior to the “I” of the individual.228  Again, by his traditionary 
anthropology, Ratzinger can evoke a non-competitive dynamic between each agent.      
 It thus appears that, over the 55 years during which Ratzinger has been treating matters of 
Scripture and Inspiration, he has remained remarkably faithful to the fundamental intuitions 
discovered in Bonaventure.  Moreover, by means of his traditionary anthropology, he has been 
able to recast inspiration as the sacred tradition of Isreal-Church, and has thus managed to 
transpose a problematic doctrine into a key at once biblical and contemporary.  Here especially, 
Ratzinger shows himself a master of the ressourcement-aggiornamento so characteristic of the 
twentieth century theologians. 
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Chapter 3 
Ratzinger on Inerrancy 
 
Having surveyed Ratzinger‟s traditionary model of inspiration, we are now in a somewhat better 
position to understand his understanding of biblical inerrancy.  This theoretical background 
proves to be especially important, since Ratzinger‟s recasting of both inspiration and inerrancy is 
sufficiently radical to render certain terms nearly obsolete.  “Inspiration,” as we have seen, can 
be replaced by “tradition” almost without remainder—provided that one understands tradition 
Ratzinger‟s stipulative sense.  Still, he occasionally continues to use “inspiration,” especially 
when attempting to speak within the horizon of other theologies. 
 The same goes a fortiori for “inerrancy,” which—as far as I am aware—appears nowhere 
in Ratzinger‟s considerable oeuvre after opening of the Second Vatican Council.  In his 1962 
address to the German speaking Bishops on De Fontibus, however, Ratzinger was still speaking 
within the horizon of theologians (i.e., the German speaking bishops) trained in the tradition of 
scholastic manuals.  In his critique of De Fontibus, he therefore uses the constellation of classic 
terms, already familiar to us through the writings of Benoit: “inerrancy,” “intention,” and 
“affirmation.”  Nonetheless, Ratzinger uses them in a stipulative and somewhat revolutionary 
way—changing both the locus and object of intention.  This document provides precious clues as 
to how Ratzinger understands both the continuity and discontinuity of his own project with the 
scholastic and magisterial framework.  It also foreshadows the position on inerrancy that 
Ratzinger will develop propria voce. 
 We will present Ratzinger‟s constructive project in two major stages.  First, we will we 
argue that Ratzinger‟s traditionary model of inspiration allows him to retool the notion of 
intention in three important ways: by the identifying the People of God as an intending “subject” 
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internal to Hoy Scripture; by calling attention to the complex layers of this corporate 
intentionality; and by reimagining Scripture‟s mode of intending Christ as its last truth. 
 In the second stage we will treat the question of method.  How does Ratzinger discern 
what Scripture properly intends and what, therefore, enjoys inerrant status?  There we will show 
Ratzinger to be an equal-opportunity “demythologizer”—one who neither automatically 
excludes nor automatically includes any field of knowledge—whether scientific, historical, 
ethical or religious—from Scripture‟s intentional horizon.  Ratzinger instead measures every 
claim materially contained in Scripture against the criterion of the substance of living faith.  In 
order to depict this process more concretely, we will examine Ratzinger‟s treatment of a quaestio 
disputata—the inerrancy of Scripture‟s claims about the Devil.  We will conclude with some 
evaluation of Ratzinger‟s achievement.  
[I] Critique of Neo-Scholastic Inerrancy 
 
In a presentation delivered to the German speaking Bishops on De Fontibus Revelationis (1962), 
the draft schema for the Constitution on Divine Revelation prepared in advance of the Second 
Vatican Council, Ratzinger offered a sharp critique of the theory of inerrancy contained therein.  
His basic complaint was that it was not sufficiently supple to accommodate the findings of 
critical historiography.  Amid the criticism, we also find the two kernels of his solution: a 
reframing of both authorial intention and Scripture‟s relationship to Truth.   
[I.1] Challenge of Critical Historiography 
 
In his evaluation of De Fontibus, Ratzinger expressed the fear that adopting the aforesaid 
schema, at least as the Preparatory Commission proposed it, could not meet the challenges posed 
by critical historiography.  This was due in part to the brittleness of the schema‟s rather 
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undifferentiated and mechanical theory of inerrancy.  When addressing “the topic of Holy 
Scripture‟s inerrancy and historicity,” for instance, Ratzinger cautioned that  
the schema speaks very sharply, as it works out this deduction: God is supreme truth and 
cannot err; but God dictated the Scripture; therefore, the Scripture is precisely just as free 
of error as is God himself - «in qualibet re religiosa vel profana»...  Here however the 
dictation theory that is assumed, as just indicated, expresses no single thought that is 
specifically Christian.
229
  
 
For Ratzinger, the schema‟s lack of a truly Christian theological horizon was nowhere 
more evident than in its inability to cope with the evidence of history.  If the “dictation theory” 
of inspiration were true—that is, if inspiration refers to God‟s historically unmediated 
instrumentalization of human mental faculties—then it follows that any and all affirmations that 
a hagiographer makes are on a par.  Any truth claim that a human author formally intends must 
be equally immune from error—regardless what subject they treat or in what part of Scripture 
they are found.
230
  On such a supposition, one would expect to find no historical or factual errors 
in Scripture, and no affirmations of the Old Testament repugnant to Christian sensibilities.  
Nonetheless, it was clear to Ratzinger that such factual errors and problematic passages 
abounded.  He in fact proposes a list: Mark‟s confusion of the High Priest Abiathar and his father 
Achimelech (Mk 2:26), the historical discrepancies between Chronicles and Kings, and Daniel‟s 
unhistorical identification of Belsazar as Nebucadnezar‟s son.231  According to Ratzinger, even 
hagiographers nod. 
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The problem this posed to the “dictation theorists” was clear enough: if the hagiographer 
sincerely meant to affirm that Belsazar was the son of Nebucadnezar, then to admit the contrary 
would make the Holy Spirit as much a liar as to admit that Christ was not the son of Mary.  Yet, 
from Ratzinger‟s perspective, not to concede such historical infelicities was to run the risk of 
stubborn fideism and to consign the Church to an intellectual ghetto.
232
 
[I.2] Intentionality Reconceived  
  
In light of both the strong magisterial affirmations of inerrancy and the ostensibly contrary 
evidences of critical historiography, Ratzinger proposes the officially sanctioned criteria for 
delimiting Scripture‟s inerrant content in a somewhat novel way.  He acknowledges that 
“according to a practically irrefutable consensus of historians there definitely are mistakes and 
errors in the Bible in profane matters of no relevance for what Scripture properly intends to 
affirm.”233  In keeping with his neo-Scholastic contemporaries, Ratzinger uses “communicative 
intention” and “degree of affirmation” to qualify the scope of inerrancy.234  But at the same time, 
he subtly transfers the locus of the intention and affirmation from the hagiographers (pace 
proponents of the prophetic-instrumental model) to Scripture itself.  He elaborates,   
Scripture is and remains inerrant and beyond doubt in everything that it properly intends 
to affirm, but this is not necessarily so in that which accompanies the affirmation and is 
not part of it. As a result, in agreement with what no. 13 says quite well, the inerrancy of 
Scripture has to be limited to its vere enuntiata [what is really affirmed]. Otherwise 
historical reason will be led into what is really an inescapable conflict.
235
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There is, it would seem, a basic agreement between Ratzinger and scholastic theologians that the 
scope of immunity from error is coterminous with the scope of intentional affirmation.  The 
major disagreement turns on the identity of the bearer of that intention.
236
 
[I.3] Intention as Christologically Differentiated  
 
Ratzinger gives attention not only to the coherence between Scripture and modern science, but 
also to the problem of Scripture‟s internal coherence and, more specifically, to the inveterate 
tension between the Old and New Testaments.  As Ratzinger sees it, the basic deficiency of the 
prophetic-instrumental model in this regard is that its leveling and de-historicizing tendencies 
actually problematized the inspiration of the Old Testament books “in all their parts.”237  No one 
denied that perpetual cultic commands given in Old Testament—coinciding, it would seem, with 
the explicit intention of the historical authors—no longer bind Christians.  Yet, enshrining a 
“dictation” model would force the Church into dividing the Old Testament somewhat crudely 
into abiding and obsolete statements.  Ratzinger marked this tendency in De Fontibus no. 15,
238
 
which taught that “the authority of the Old Testament continues in force in those matters that are 
related to the founding of the Christian religion.”  For Ratzinger, this “says both too little and too 
much.”239  It says too little because it suggests that some parts of the Old Testament are simply 
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consigned to the past.  It says too much because it implies that some parts of the Old Testament 
were already “directly Christian and as such continue in force.”240   
Ratzinger, for his part, argues that the “whole Old Testament … speaks of Christ, for its 
intention is Christological and as such it is the basis and foundation of the Christian religion.”  
Nevertheless, every part of the Old Testament must undergo a “Christological transformation 
and it then has force not from itself but from Christ and in reference to Christ, who is the one 
who removes the veil that covered the face of Moses (2 Cor 3:12-18).”  If the Old Testament is 
indeed inspired in all its parts, it is derivatively inspired rather than directly so.  Here we see not 
so much a theory of “degrees of affirmation” (pace Benoit)241 as a theory of “modes of 
affirmation”—directly and indirectly Christological.  Ratzinger presents this internal, 
Christological normativity as essential to a genuinely Christian theory of inerrancy. 
 Globally speaking, Ratzinger called for a theory of inerrancy that was both historically 
credible and internally differentiated according to specifically Christian criteria.  As he saw it in 
1962, the Church needed to limit inerrancy not according to a quantitative division but according 
to a tantum-quantum model.  To the extent that Scripture‟s content pertains to the truth of Christ, 
to that same extent it is inerrant.  Though this line of thought would require further development, 
we can already detect a basic desideratum as well as the faint outlines of a constructive proposal 
in his critique of inerrancy as treated in De Fontibus,  
[II] Traditionary Intentionality and Inerrancy  
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When Ratzinger undertakes to satisfy his own desideratum, he does so in a manner consistent 
with his traditionary understanding of inspiration.  As we shall see, his understanding of 
inspiration as sacred tradition provides the theoretical groundwork for 1) the transfer of the locus 
of intention from the historical author to Scripture as a whole; 2) his presentation of the 
complexity interior to that intention; and 3) his explication of the Scripture‟s holistic mode of 
intending the truth of Christ.  We will present the theoretical underpinnings for Ratzinger‟s 
positive project in that order. 
[II.1] Locus of Intention 
 
An immediate objection confronts Ratzinger‟s constructive project.  Everything that follows 
depends on the legitimacy of the move already evident in 1962: namely, the transfer of the 
intention from the historical author to Scripture itself.  Yet can Scripture be considered the bearer 
of its own intention in any meaningful way?  Or is this simply a poetic dodge?  From what has 
been in the last chapter about Ratzinger‟s understanding of inspiration as the textual dimension 
of sacred tradition, the outlines of an answer are clear.
242
  First, the bible—considered as inert 
text—cannot be properly identified with revelation but only with the “material principle of 
revelation” (Materialprinzip der Offenbarung).243  This follows from the fact that Ratzinger 
understands revelation as a “living reality that requires a living person as the locus of its 
presence.”244  Furthermore, to this living reality mediated by Scripture, only the attitude of faith 
can respond adequately: “[R]evelation has only arrived where, in addition to the material 
assertions witnessing to it, its inner reality has itself become effective after the manner of 
faith.”245  Finally, only the bible received in faith constitutes “Holy Scripture,” which alone is 
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Scripture in the theological sense, that is, in the sense pertinent to issues of inerrancy.  Hence, the 
believing subject belongs to the very definition of Holy Scripture, and Holy Scripture may be 
said to have an inerrant “intention” on the basis of its living subject.     
In his writings after the Council, Ratzinger makes this same point through the image of 
Scripture‟s “living voice.”  In its naked verbalness, the true intention of the bible is not 
discernible; rather, it is analogous to an unvoiced word.  Ratzinger points to the many exegetical 
about-faces of the last century as evidence that Scripture (qua text) lacks the “transparent clarity” 
(durchsichtigen Klarheit) or “perspecuitas” that Luther ascribed to it.246  Since faith cannot stand 
on such unstable ground, the very nature of the word calls for the confirmation of a “living 
voice.”247  It requires a “viva vox” to “preserve its proper perspecuitas, its clear meaning, 
from the conflict of hypotheses.”248  For reasons that will become clear below, the authoritative 
bearer of this living voice is the Church.  For now it is sufficient to mark Ratzinger‟s insistence 
upon “muteness” of Scripture materially considered.   
On the basis of this stipulative definition of Holy Scripture as text-plus-living-subject, 
Ratzinger can speak of Scripture‟s intention in a fashion that is more than simply poetic.  It goes 
without saying that such a “personification” of Scripture would be inconsistent with any model 
of inspiration that identified revelation too closely with the material content of the Bible (as 
Ratzinger considers the neo-scholastics to have done). Being formless and inanimate, texts in 
themselves can “speak” only in conjunction with an intending subject, much as an arrow can 
only “seek” what an archer first intends.  In the absence of a living subject internal to Scripture, 
proponents of the prophetic-instrumental model had no alternative but to hold up the intention of 
the historical author as last court of appeals in interpretive disputes.  Ratzinger, on the other 
                                                 
246
 Ratzinger, Dogma Und Verkündigung, 28. 
247
 Ratzinger, Church, Ecumenism, Politics: New Essays in Ecclesiology, 80. 
248
 Ratzinger, Pilgrim Fellowship of Faith : The Church as Communion , 35.  Emphasis original. 
 77 
hand, buttressed by his traditionary theory of inspiration, felt little obligation to uphold the mind 
of the author as Scripture‟s highest hermeneutical tribunal. 
[II.2] Intention as Complex 
 
Having briefly reviewed Ratzinger‟s argument for the existence of Scripture‟s “living subject,” it 
behooves us to explore the complex identity of said subject and how this identity sheds light on 
Scripture‟s complex intentionality.  This will require us briefly to review Ratzinger‟s traditionary 
anthropology and to show how his adoption of this model entails both an intensive and an 
extensive “complexification” of Scripture.  Extensively, as we shall see, it implies the 
multiplication of Scripture‟s subjects; intensively, it requires a differentiation of intentional 
layers within the one subject that Ratzinger refers to as the People of God.  
Extensive: The most obvious consequence of Ratzinger‟s traditionary anthropology is the 
addition of a third agent, the People of God, to the two agents already affirmed in Medieval and 
neo-scholastic schema—namely, God and the sacred author.  As Ratzinger presents it, the 
transcendent, the historical, and the communal all constitute inner dimensions of the human 
person, dimensions deeply marking his spiritual and intellectual life.
249
 Consequently, God‟s 
word cannot truly express itself modo humano unless it indwells a particular communal 
history.
250
  This communal history cannot in turn remain a present and vital reality unless it is 
passed on as tradition, that is, unless it accumulates in the memory of a single trans-historical 
subject: the People of God.
251
  Ratzinger quite explicitly suggests that we do better to imagine 
three interlocking subjects of Scripture—the individual author, the Church, and God.  
Enumerating them in order of authorial “depth,” he concludes,    
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One could say that the books of Scripture involve three interacting subjects.  First of all, 
there is the individual author or group of authors to whom we owe a particular scriptural 
text.  But these authors are not autonomous authors in the modern sense; they form part 
of a collective subject, the “People of God,” from within whose heart and to whom they 
speak.  Hence this subject is actually the deeper „author‟ of the Scriptures.  And yet, 
likewise, this people does not exist alone; rather, it is led, and spoken to, by God himself, 
who—through men and their humanity—is at the deepest level the one speaking.”252  
 
Though there are three subjects, it is evident nonetheless that the intentions of the three subjects 
can never ultimately clash.  The coherence of Scripture‟s message depends on the unity of God, 
who is mostly deeply the subject and the truth of Scripture.  The sacred author
253
 and the 
Church
254
 are subjects of Scripture only to the extent that God has first made himself their 
subjects.   
At the same time, this multiplication of subjects is not without consequence for our 
understanding of inerrancy—and this for two reasons.  First, the People of God functions more 
deeply as the subject of Scripture than does the individual author.  The words of individuals 
survive only if they are recognized as having import for the community.  This gives the words of 
Scripture a plasticity of meaning, since here 
the author is not simply speaking for himself on his own authority.  He is speaking from 
the perspective of a history that sustains him and that already implicitly contains the 
possibilities of its future, of the further stages of its journey.  This process of continually 
rereading and drawing out new meanings from words would not have been possible 
unless the words themselves were already open to it from within.
255
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The interplay between the different subjects of Scripture, in other words, is evident in the self-
transcendent character of Scripture‟s language.   
Intensive: The mention of “further stages of the journey” brings us to the second root of 
the complexification of Scripture‟s intention: the historical diversity of its subject.  Though the 
People of God has never lost her identity—thanks to her ongoing union with Christ—she has 
nonetheless passed through diverse “stages” and “modes” of union with the divine subject:  
[The Church] is, in a certain respect, comparable to a human being, who, by 
physiological and psychological norms, is but a succession of states yet who knows, for 
all that, that he is always himself.  We must ask, then, What constitutes the Church as 
subject?  What makes her what she is?  If we recall that Paul formulated the concept of 
the Church as a subject that remains constant in the midst of change when he called her a 
“body” (a “self”), we can look to him also for the answer.  From being an amorphous 
mass of individuals, the Church is constituted as a subject by him whom Paul names the 
head, namely, Christ… She exists as Church by reason of her union with Him.256 
 
If the People of God, as the believing (or intending) subject of Scripture, can show internal 
diversity yet remain unified in Christ, it follows that her intentionality can also show internal 
diversity yet remain unified in Christ.  Her affirmation of the content of Scripture varies 
according to the “layer” in which the content is located.  This is what is meant by intensive 
complexity.    
Concretely, Ratzinger offers four fundamental layers of Scriptural intention and 
interpretation, from which one can infer a tripartite division of the People of God.
257
   Among the 
interpretive layers, there is first the Old Testament theology of the Old Testament.  This is 
basically what “the historian ascertains within the Old Testament and which has of course 
already developed a number of overlapping layers even there, in which old texts are reread and 
reinterpreted in light of new events.”  Second, there is a New Testament theology of the Old 
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Testament.  This is a “new interpretation, in light of the Christ event, that is not produced by 
mere historical reflection on the Old Testament alone.”  Ratzinger notes that such a 
reinterpretation is not “completely foreign to the nature of the Old Testament … which itself 
lives and grows through such reinterpretations.”  Third, there is the New Testament theology of 
the New Testament, which is basically the “theology that the historian can derive as such from 
within the New Testament, which—until the close of the canon—“derives its structure from the 
same kind of growth” as the Old Testament witnessed.  Finally, there is the ecclesial theology of 
the New Testament, which represents the “extra” element of ecclesial tradition, the 
unobjectifiable presence of Christ in the Church.  This theology finds its linguistic expression in 
dogma, which is neither “simply identical with the inner, historically ascertainable New 
Testament theology of the New Testament” nor “something merely exterior to it.” Dogma simply 
continues along the developmental path evident within Scripture itself.  In sum, Ratzinger 
presents the interrelation between the various intentional “layers” in a complex analogy: Old 
Testament : New Testament :: New Testament : Dogma.
258
 
On the basis of these four layers, the three phases of the People of God are manifest: Old 
Testament Era, New Testament era, and the Church.
259
  She knows, in other words, three 
modalities of being Scripture‟s subject.  Each historical modality corresponds to a distinct 
modality of the language of faith, a distinct manner of expressing the truth of Christ.  Each 
intentional layer retains its own integrity; it is neither abrogated nor wrenched from its original 
meaning.  Yet, each layer is correlated with the whole, and is in this way opened to future 
possibilities already implicit within it: “Thus every individual part derives its meaning from the 
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whole, and the whole derives its meaning from its end—from Christ.”260  This is the global 
hermeneutic suggested by Ratzinger‟s traditionary model of inspiration. 
[II.3] Mode of Intending: Hierarchically Symphonic  
   
From what has been said already about the nuanced intentionality of Scripture, it is clear that the 
modus significandi of Scripture follow upon the modus essendi of its living subject.  The one 
People of God has retained her identity across all her historical transformations because she has 
been guided by and toward the same God.  In a parallel fashion, Scripture proposes itself as a 
hierarchically ordered whole, a totality replete with inner tensions and contrastive images.
261
  
Ratzinger gives balanced attention to both aspects—i.e., to both the overarching unity and to the 
asymmetrical relations between the parts.  In order to concretize this aspect of Ratzinger‟s 
biblical theology, we will explore 1) Ratzinger‟s understanding of Scripture as symphonia, 2) the 
relationship between the Old and New Testaments, and 3) the relationship between the Scripture 
and Dogma.   
Symphonia: Using a patristic metaphor, Ratzinger compares the truth of Scripture or, 
better yet, the manner in which Scripture bears witness to this truth, to a symphony. 
Symphonia serves to express the unity of the Old and New Testaments—which is the 
unity of law and gospel, of prophets and apostles, but also the unity of the diverse 
writings of the New Testament among themselves.  At issue here is the basic form of the 
expression of truth in the Church, a form which rests upon a structure enriched by 
manifold tensions.  The truth of faith resonates not as a mono-phony but as sym-phony, 
not as homophonic, but as a polyphonic melody composed of the many apparently quite 
discordant strains in the contrapuntal interplay of law prophets, Gospels, and apostles.
262
 
 
                                                 
260
 Ratzinger, In the Beginning...: A Catholic Understanding of the Story of Creation and the Fall, 9. 
261
 For a more detailed discussion of Ratzinger‟s general identification of truth with the whole, see Kaes, Theologie 
Im Anspruch Von Geschichte Und Wahrheit : Zur Hermeneutik Joseph Ratzingers, 46-49. 
262
 Ratzinger, The Nature and Mission of Theology : Essays to Orient Theology in Today's Debates, 83-84.  See also 
Ratzinger, Eschatology: Death and Eternal Life, 41, where Ratzinger comments on the tensions between the four 
Gospels: “The Church was right to reject Tatian‟s attempt to create a unified gospel: no such literal harmonization 
can be the Gospel itself.  It is as a choir of four that the Gospel comes before the understanding of faith …”  Italics 
mine. 
 82 
Here Ratzinger is elaborating upon the unity between the first three interpretive layers of 
Scripture listed above: the Old Testament theology of the Old Testament, the New Testament 
Theology of the New Testament, and the New Testament theology of the New Testament.   
At other times Ratzinger includes the fourth layer, the ecclesial theology of the New 
Testament, thus adding another movement to the one biblical symphony: 
It is precisely in this profusion of the forms of faith in the unity of the Old and New 
Testaments, of the New Testament of early Church dogma, all of these elements together 
and the ongoing life of faith, which increases the excitement and fecundity of inquiry.  To 
seek the inner unity and totality of truth in the grand historical structure of faith with its 
abundant contrasts is more stimulating and productive than to cut knots and to assert that 
this unity does not exist.
263
 
 
Only the attitude of faith can see the whole in this welter of tensions and contrasts.   
But the reverse is also true.  Only a book whose internal perspectives are partially 
contrastive and, for that reason, mutually corrective can really point beyond itself to the ineffable 
truth of faith.  The deeper authority of Scripture is evident in its mode of expression.  One sign of 
the unique depth of divine involvement in Scripture is its iconic and differentiated self-
expression:   
The deeper human words penetrate into the essence of reality, the more insufficient they 
become.  All of this emerges more clearly if we turn our attention to the concrete 
evidence of the language of faith, which is characterized by two immediately obvious 
facts.  First, this speech consists of images, not concepts.  Second, it presents itself in a 
historical succession of statements.
264
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These images realize their true expressive potential only as an ensemble: “Scripture … never 
tolerates the monarchical supremacy of single image.  By utilizing many images it keeps open a 
perspective on the Indescribable.”265  Moreover, the strain of trying to reconcile the various 
images channels the reader toward Christ, who alone can “give back to us, renewed, the truth of 
the images.”266    Scripture directs the reader beyond itself to Christ through the self-effacement 
of its contrastive yet convergent elements.  This is what Ratzinger means when he calls Scripture 
symphonia. 
Old and New Testaments: At the same, such a unitary vision becomes possible only by 
acknowledging the hypotaxis of the parts.  Unless a “slope” of normativity is established, Old 
Testament, New Testament and Dogma can exhibit only the disintegrated pluralism of a heap, 
not the integrated pluralism of the “one living organism of the word of God.”267  Why not read 
the New Testament in light of the Old, rather than vice-versa?  Why not simply replace Scripture 
with the latest dogmas?  Ratzinger explains the gradient of normativity as function of the 
relationship of the part to Christ. 
The most asymmetrical ordering obtains between the Old and New Testaments.  We 
already had a chance to preview Ratzinger‟s position on the relation between the Testaments in 
his critique of De Fontibus—to which he remains true along the length of his career.  Ratzinger 
explains that the Old Testament retains a permanent validity because Scripture can point to the 
living God only as a whole and through the inner dynamic of salvation history.
268
  Consequently, 
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truly biblical preaching cannot simply pass over the Old Testament.  Christian proclamation 
remains bound to the heilgeschichtliche pattern of Law-Gospel, and the sequence remains 
“irreversible” (unumkehrbar).269  The Old Testament is ordered, in other words, to fulfillment in 
the New, not vice-versa.  Indeed, Ratzinger holds that the Old Testament is not even God‟s word 
as such, but only as it transcends itself in the New Testament.
270
  Hence, Scripture reads 
“forwards” rather than “backwards,” and proposes the Old Testament only “with a view to 
Christ.”271  In other words, though the Old Testament remains integral to Scripture, the New 
Testament—by virtue of its direct reference to Christ—is something of a norma normans and the 
Old something of a norma normata. 
Dogma and Scripture: Dogma and Scripture, for their part, show a more reciprocal 
normativity.  Ratzinger implies both sides of this reciprocity in defining dogma as nothing other 
than the ecclesial interpretation of Scripture.
272
  On the one hand, as interpretation, dogma 
actualizes and clarifies Scripture.  Since Scripture builds its truth upon a structure of images and 
narratives, its manner of expression often lacks conceptual definition.  Dogma provides the 
necessary “interpretation, in which the polyvalent image-language of Scripture is translated into 
the mono-valence (Eindeutigkeit) of the concept.”273  In this way dogma maintains Scripture as a 
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vital reality: “[T]he interpreted lives only through interpretation.”274  In the limited respect of its 
clarifying and vivifying function, dogma seems to norm Scripture.  This regulatory function over 
Scripture perhaps accounts for Ratzinger‟s assertion that ecclesial theology relates to Scripture as 
the New Testament (norma normans) relates to the Old (norma normata).    
 Nonetheless, Ratzinger more often gives attention to the respects in which Scripture 
“outranks” dogma—namely, its inherent authority and depth of expression.  Ratzinger suggests 
that is the very nature of the interpreted to “stand over” its interpretation;275 for interpretation is 
always referring back to something else as its ultimate “measure.”276  Additionally, since the 
world of concepts proves more transient and unstable than the world of primordial images (the 
idiom most prevalent in Scripture), there eventually comes a time when Scripture must interpret 
dogmatic pronouncements rather than vice-versa.
277
  Hence, Scripture and Dogma turn out to be 
mutually normative.  Scripture, as God‟s Word, enjoys a deeper authority than dogma; yet 
Scripture touches the present only through dogmatic interpretation.  
The most comprehensive and authoritative interpretation of Scripture will, of course, be 
that of its living subject—the Church.  From this perspective we can see why Ratzinger locates 
dogma within—rather than alongside—the complex “organism of the Word of God.”  Dogma 
cannot represent any sort of eisegetical violence against Scripture, for the “teaching office of the 
apostles‟ successors does not represent a second authority alongside Scripture but is inwardly a 
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part of it.”278  Dogma is not a second word so much as it is a fresh voicing of the same word.  We 
also perceive more easily why Scripture requires the Church‟s “living voice.”  Since Scripture is 
a mélange of narratives and images, it lacks the clarity that the assent of faith requires.  Hence, 
Scripture needs “the authority of the Church that speaks out” if it is to serve as the language of 
faith.
279
 
One might say, in summary, that Ratzinger‟s traditionary model of inerrancy both 
simplifies and complicates the intention of Scripture.  The model simplifies Scripture‟s intention 
because it furnishes metaphysical grounds for speaking of a single intention—that of the whole 
of Scripture.  These grounds are nothing other than the organic interpenetration of Scripture‟s 
three subjects—God, the People of God, the human authors—and the underlying unity of the 
People of God across her historical pilgrimage.
280
  At the same time, Ratzinger‟s model also 
“complicates” matters because it presents that Scripture‟s global intention—the mystery of 
Christ—as a light refracted through the prism of human history into a spectrum of “successive 
states.”  The pure light of Christ becomes visible again only if one attempts to reverse this 
spectrification, if one bends the various bands—Old Testament, New Testament, and Church—
back toward a common center.  This is accomplished by marking how, in each of her historical 
“phases” the one People of God “intends” and “affirms” the language of her faith in diverse yet 
complementary ways.  
[III] How does one discern the intention of Scripture? 
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In view of Scripture‟s complex and holistic mode of intention, one begins to wonder how one 
might decide what belongs to Scripture‟s affirmation and what merely accompanies it.  Ratzinger 
does not offer a simple answer.  However, he does not propose dividing Scripture quantitatively 
into fallible and infallible passages, or limiting inerrancy to statements concerning faith and 
morals.  Ratzinger instead proposes a sort of Catholic “demythologization,” and provides four 
concrete criteria for “demythologizing” correctly.  We will develop Ratzinger‟s thought in the 
order suggested above, beginning with Ratzinger‟s treatment of inerrancy in matters of scientific, 
historical, and ethico-religious matters.  Second, we will introduce the version of 
“demythologization” that Ratzinger develops in explicit conversation with Bultmann.  Finally, 
we will examine a quaestio disputata probed by Ratzinger: whether Scripture teaches inerrantly 
the existence of the Devil.    
[III.1] Historical, Scientific, Ethical-Religious Claims 
 
On Ratzinger‟s view, Scripture intends to affirm its own expressions only as pointing beyond 
themselves, that is, only as a material witness to the single complex truth that is God‟s self-
disclosure in Christ.  This does not mean, however, that Scripture is “inspired” or “inerrant” only 
in matters of faith and morals.
281
  Rather, because Christ, the incarnate Logos, grounds all 
rationality, the intention of Scripture must be said to encompass scientific, historical and 
religious claims—though only to the extent that each bears upon the mystery of Christ. 
With respect to science and history, Ratzinger makes this point clear in his essay, 
“Exegesis and the Magisterium of the Church” (2003).  There he affirms that the relationship 
between the claims of scientific reason and the claims of the Scripture “can never be settled once 
and for all, because the faith attested to by the Bible also involves the material world; the Bible 
still makes claims about his world—concerning its origin as a whole and man‟s origin in 
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particular.”282  To exclude science scientific content from Scripture absolutely, in other words, is 
effectively to abandon a the notion of a single domain of truth and of the harmony between faith 
and reason. 
In what is perhaps a faint allusion to the argument of Providentissimus Deus,
283
 Ratzinger 
suggests that “something analogous can be said with respect to history” as was said with respect 
to natural science.
284
  For the sake of the integrity of the Incarnation, the relevance of historical 
facts to faith cannot be precluded tout court:  
The opinion that faith as such has nothing to do with historical facts and must leave their 
investigation to the historians in Gnosticism.  It dis-incarnates the faith and turns it into a 
pure idea.  But precisely the ontological realism of historical events is intrinsically 
constitutive of the faith that originates from the Bible.  A God that cannot intervene in 
history and show himself in it is not the God of the Bible.  For this reason, the reality of 
Jesus‟ birth from the Virgin Mary, the real institution of the Last Supper by Jesus 
himself, his bodily Resurrection from the dead—the fact that the tomb was empty—are 
all an element of the faith itself that it can and must defend against supposedly better 
historical knowledge.
285
 
 
Despite his insistence upon the fundamental historicity of the Scripture, Ratzinger does not show 
himself much exercised by the difficulty of harmonizing every historical detail.  The presence of 
Christ transmitted through tradition frees the Christian from anxiety over reconstructing the 
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ipsissima vox of Jesus.
286
  In fact, as Ratzinger sees it, tensions in the historical narratives may 
signal that the truth intended lies on a higher plane.
287
     
In various other writings, Ratzinger extends this analogy even to matters of religious 
observance and morality.  Ratzinger acknowledges, for instance, that contemporary historical 
awareness has rendered Scripture‟s authority problematic even in religious matters:  
[T]he Bible, venerated by faith as the word of God, has been disclosed to us, by 
historical-critical scholarship, as a thoroughly human book.  Not only are its literary 
forms those of the world that produced it, but its manner of thought, even in respect to 
religious topics, has been determined by the world in which it arose.
288
   
 
Here the provisional status Mosaic Law serves as an obvious example.
289
  However, Ratzinger 
finds even the New Testament ethical and religious directives so culture-bound as to be “purely 
of human right.”290  As examples he cites “the stipulations of James, the veiling of women, 
marriage legislation of 1 Corinthians 7”—in short, loci classici already well known to the 
Fathers of Trent.
291
  Ethical and religious teachings, it turns out, are subject to the same sort of 
scrutiny as history and science. 
[III.2] Worldview and Demythologization 
 
In each domain, then—science, history, religion and morality—there is a similar problem of the 
relationship between revelation and the historically conditioned worldview by which it is 
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mediated.  As truly—albeit not exclusively—human words, Scripture may carry a content 
accidental to its proper affirmation, a content that would not therefore enjoy inerrant status.  Of 
its very nature, then Scripture calls for “demythologization.”   
In an irenic manner, Ratzinger explains that “Catholic theology has always practiced the 
„demythologization‟ of Scripture—that is, the spiritual translation of its social imaginary 
(Bildwelt) into the contemporary intellectual world (Verständniswelt) of the believer—and 
practices it still today to a high degree in the discrimination between expressive form and 
expressive content (Aussageform und -inhalt).”292  In writings spanning the length of his career, 
Ratzinger evokes the relationship of between the truth and myth through various images of 
center and periphery.  Accordingly, one must distinguish “core” (Kern) and “rind”  (Schale),293 
“revelation” (Offenbarung) and “rind” (Schale),294 the “content of the expression” 
(Aussageinhalt) and the “form of the expression” (Aussageform),295  “faith” and “worldview” 
(Weltbild),
296
 the “outward form of the message” and the “real message of the whole,”297 the 
“form of portrayal” and the “content that is portrayed.”298  Such discernment between intended 
and accidental content is a legitimate function of the Church and her theologians.   
In this limited sense, Ratzinger sympathizes with Bultmann‟s project of 
“demythologization.”  What he finds objectionable is not “demythologization” per se, but the 
criteria by which Bultmann sifts truth from myth.  Bultmann‟s mistake was to deploy “criteria 
alien to revelation” (Offenbarungsfremde Kriterien), which prove to be finally reducible to the 
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criteria of Scripture‟s compatibility with existentialist philosophy.299  The properly Catholic 
criterion, by contrast, is nothing other than the “living substance of the living faith of the 
Church.”300  Just as Christ alone could distinguish between divine will and human accretion in 
the tradition of Israel,
301
 so also is the Church—on the basis of her union with Christ—uniquely 
competent to perform such a discernment: 
What is revelation and what is rind (Schale) can never be ascertained by the individual 
theologian—from his own perspective—on the basis of scholarly presuppositions 
(wissenschaftlicher Vorgegebenheiten); this, in the end, only the living community of 
faith can decide, which—as the Body of Christ—is the abiding presence of Christ, who 
does not let his disposal over his work slip from his grasp.
302
   
 
For Ratzinger, reliance on any criterion other than the faith of the Church inevitably ends up 
subjecting revelation to the limitations of human philosophy. 
[III.3] Case Study: Galileo and the Devil 
 
Still, the Church‟s faith ordinarily presents itself as a single intuitive whole.  Its internal variety 
and historical expansiveness make it an unwieldy instrument for winnowing Scripture‟s intended 
content from its accidental accompaniments.  In his little-known essay “Abschied vom Teufel?” 
(1973), however, Ratzinger does show how the Church‟s substance can be analysed into more 
serviceable sub-criteria and then be applied to a biblical quaestio disputata.  In “Abschied,” 
Ratzinger responds to the argument of the Tübingen Alttestamentler Herbert Haag that the 
biblical motif of the “Devil” is nothing other than the concept of “Sin” in mythological dress.  
Personified evil does not exist as such.  Ratzinger argues not that all demythologization is 
illegitimate, but that Haag failed to apply the “tests” (Maβstäbe) appropriate to Scripture.  He 
instead proposes a diagnostic battery of his own for identifying Scripture‟s true intention: 1) the 
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relationship between the two Testaments with respect to the affirmation in question, 2) the 
relationship of the affirmation to the inner shape of Christian existence, 3) the relationship of the 
affirmation to the Church, and 4) the relationship to right reason.  In attempts to clarify his 
position through contrast, Ratzinger considers two unequally qualified candidates for 
demythologization: Geocentrism and the Devil.  We will review how Ratzinger applies each of 
the four tests to these Scriptural contents. 
Old and New Testaments: The first test, that of the relationship between the two 
Testaments, already begins to separate Galileo‟s claim that the earth revolves around the sun 
from Haag‟s claim that the Devil is but the poetic expression of human sin.  In the domains of 
cosmogony and creation, Ratzinger observes, the scope of the biblical affirmation contracts 
considerably in the transition from Old to New Testament.  “If one applies this test (Maβstab), it 
becomes evident that John 1:1 is the New Testament‟s reception of the Genesis text and that it 
sums up its colorful depictions in a single expression: In the beginning was the word.  
Everything else was thereby relegated to the world of images.”  Whereas biblical interest in 
cosmogony shows a “movement of contraction” in the transition from Old Testament to New, 
interest in the demonic shows a contrasting “movement of expansion.”  Whereas the 
“representation of demonic powers enters only haltingly (zögernd) into the Old Testament; by 
contrast, it achieves in the life of Jesus an unheard of vehemence, which remains valid in Paul 
and in the last writing of the New Testament …”  Hence, the two cases show distinct 
developmental trajectories, with the rising trajectory of the demonic suggesting its permanent 
validity.
303
  
Christian Existence: The second test, that of the “relationship of an expression to the 
inner fullness of faith and the life of faith,” yields a similar decision.  Christ not only drives out 
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demons, but passes this authority and mission on to his disciples, such that it now belongs to the 
way of discipleship.  In other words, “The form of Jesus, its spiritual physiognomy, does not 
change, whether the sun revolves around the earth or the earth moves around the sun … but it 
changes decisively, if one cuts out of it the experience of struggle against the power of the 
demonic kingdom.”  If we can no longer affirm a reality so central to Christ‟s own self-
understanding and the understanding of his contemporaries, then we cannot claim to share the 
same faith.
304
 
The Church: The third test is simply an extension from the “spiritual physiognomy” of 
Christ to the spiritual physiognomy of the Church, the whole Christ.  Ratzinger asserts that the 
Eucharistic and the Baptismal liturgies belong to the Church‟s “fundamental form (Grundform) 
of prayer and life.”  The great doctrinal affirmations of the fourth century—the divinity of Christ, 
the divinity of the Spirit, and the Trinity—were decided precisely according to the consequences 
that their negation would have had on the language and experience of Christian worship.  
Ratzinger points out that St. Basil upheld the full divinity of the Holy Spirit principally on the 
grounds that one “must be able to take [the baptismal liturgy] at its word.”  Yet a serious 
consideration of this same baptismal liturgy does not favor excising Satan from the content of the 
faith; for the “exorcism and the renunciation of the devil belong to the core event 
(Kerngeschehen) of baptism; the latter, together with profession of Jesus Christ, forms the 
indispensable entryway into the sacrament.”  Moreover, the perennial experience of saints in 
every age—whose awareness of demonic activity seems to grow in direct proportion to their 
holiness—suggests that demons belong to the true faith of the Church and thus to the abiding 
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affirmation of Scripture.  Geocentrism, by contrast, is not intimately linked to the Church‟s 
existential form.
305
           
Reason:  Ratzinger lists “compatibility with scholarly knowledge” as a final test in the 
“question of „worldview‟” (Frage des »Weltbildes«).  Obviously, this test long ago revealed that 
geocentrism falls outside the central affirmation of Scripture.  Haag would argue that demons 
have been displaced by this standard as well, with psychology and medical science having 
rendered them an unnecessary hypothesis.  Yet, as Ratzinger points out, only “in a world 
functionally considered” would demons be ruled out of court.  In “pure functionalism,” 
moreover, “there is neither place for God nor for the human person as human person, but only 
for the human person as function; much more is at stake here than simply the idea of the 
„Devil.‟”  Any worldview incompatible with the “Devil,” in other words, is also incompatible 
with God and thus with “sin” in the Christian sense.  Haag‟s approach ends not in a nuanced 
discrimination between the Kern and Schale of the bible, but in a wholesale rejection of Kern 
and Schale alike.
306
 
While Ratzinger‟s ecclesial method of demythologization reveals geocentrism to belong 
to the Schale of biblical revelation, it reveals the existence of personal evil to belong to its 
perennially valid Kern.  Though he is not so explicit about his criteria elsewhere, these four 
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constitute the touchstones by which Ratzinger discerns the intended—and, therefore, inerrant—
content of Scripture.
307
  Ratzinger‟s “Catholic” demythologization does not imply any a priori 
restriction of inerrancy to faith and morals.  Naturally, scientific content will be more easily 
demythologized than religious or ethical content, since the latter domains are more closely 
connected with faith in the Incarnation.  Formally, however, scientific, historical, moral, and 
religious contents are together lumped under the same Frage des Weltbildes.  Calls for 
demythologization are countenanced in each field to the extent that such a concession proves 
compatible with the perennial faith of the Church.  Put another way, the content of Scripture is 
guaranteed to be inerrant to the extent that it informs belief in any of the manifold dimensions of 
the mystery of Christ.   
[IV] Conclusion: Strengths, Weaknesses, Comparisons 
 
How then are we evaluate Ratzinger‟s traditionary model of inerrancy?  Its strengths are 
numerous and important.  First, it is sufficiently nuanced to be compatible with the findings of 
scientific historiography.  It commits the Catholic exegete neither to vindicating every doubtful 
historical detail of Scripture nor to supposing that the historical author did not really intend what 
he said—e.g., that the author of Daniel did not really intend to affirm that Belsazar was 
Nebucadnezar‟s son.308   
Second, despite the flexibility of his model of inerrancy, Ratzinger does not present 
Scripture as totally—or even largely—without inerrant content.  Scripture is not therefore an ink 
                                                 
307
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blot whose shape is given by the unconscious projections of its readers.
309
  Scripture has a 
definite content, and that content can be discerned in the faith of the Church and applied to 
quaestiones disputatae through the Church‟s living voice.   
Third, Ratzinger develops the doctrine of inerrancy by modifying the underlying 
assumptions of the Biblical encyclicals while maintaining their explicit affirmations.  He does 
not, for instance, divide Scripture quantitatively into inerrant and indifferent subject matter.  
Moreover, he builds upon the important concession of the biblical encyclicals—that the 
inerrancy of Scripture extends only as far as the explicit intention of its subject.  He simply 
identifies the People of God (as opposed to the hagiographer) the primary bearer of said intention 
and makes the truth of Christ the chief object thereof.  This, however, sets off a hermeneutical 
domino effect, suggesting a “symphonic” mode of expressing Christ and a complex of criteria 
for discerning Scripture‟s inerrant and abiding content.  
Over and against the prophetic instrumental model, Ratzinger‟s traditionary model would 
share all these advantages in common with the model of N. Lohfink.  The principal advantage 
that Ratzinger‟s model has over Lohfink‟s is its thicker metaphysical foundation.  Lohfink shifts 
from “inerrant authors” to “inerrant book” without identifying the subject of the book or the 
agent of its tradition.  Similarly, Lohfink advises reading Scripture as a whole without grounding 
the practice in the transtemporal identity of the People of God.
310
  Finally, Ratzinger‟s 
traditionary anthropology better accounts for how the words of the historical author could be 
open to transcendence from the outset.  Just as the human person is open to God and community 
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“from within,” so will the inspired author‟s words be open “from within” to self-transcendence 
and growth in meaning.  
Are there weaknesses in Ratzinger‟s presentation?  Two perhaps suggest themselves.  
First, one occasionally gets the impression that Ratzinger—especially in his early writing—is not 
giving a nuanced presentation of the theology that he is criticizing.  The neo-scholastics whom 
Ratzinger opposes often saw their positions as an alternative to mechanical “dictation theory.”311  
Moreover, Ratzinger does not engage the tradition of genre criticism, which was used broadly in 
neo-scholastic circles to account for such trivial errors of fact.
312
  Though he may have cogent 
reasons for doubting the sufficiency of the generic solution, he does not divulge them.   
The second point is not so much a weakness as a contingency.  One‟s evaluation of 
Ratzinger‟s theory of inerrancy will depend on how one evaluates his traditionary anthropology 
and the traditionary model of inspiration that flows from it.  The most questionable load-bearing 
pillar in Ratzinger‟s edifice is surely the psychological realism with which he treats the People of 
God.  To the extent that one can conceive of the People of God as a “corporate personality” 
endowed with her own intending consciousness and living voice, one will probably find 
Ratzinger‟s solution convincing.  This is simply to say that much turns on Ratzinger‟s 
ecclesiology, the adequate treatment of which lies beyond the scope of this essay. 
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Nonetheless, Ratzinger‟s reframing of inerrancy may stand as a lasting achievement.  It 
constitutes one of the most metaphysically integrated and hermeneutically sophisticated attempts 
to describe how Scripture is true.  As such, it represents a plausible mediation of the tension 
inherent in the formulation of inerrancy in Dei Verbum §11: “We must acknowledge the Books 
of Scripture as teaching firmly, faithfully, and without error the truth that God wished to be 
recorded in the sacred writings for the sake of salvation.”313  By putting truth and “worldview” in 
a tantum-quantum relationship, Ratzinger combines the Constitution‟s (materially-quantitatively) 
unqualified affirmation of Scripture‟s veracity with the Constitution‟s affirmation of God‟s 
salvific purpose.  The canonical books are inerrant as a whole and “with all their parts,” but only 
to the extent that they touch upon the intention of the whole—the mystery of Christ. 
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Conclusion 
 
 With his Bonaventurean-traditionary-dialogical model of inspiration, Ratzinger keeps a 
certain theological independence vis-à-vis both Rahner‟s Molinist-ecclesial-predefinitive model 
and Benoit‟s Thomist-prophetic-instrumental model (and, therefore, the theological assumptions 
of the biblical encyclicals).  Though his parting of ways with Benoit is more overt, Ratzinger 
also distances himself from Rahner, whom he viewed as presenting the phenomena of salvation 
history and inspiration too formally.  By subsuming inspiration under the broader phenomenon 
of sacred tradition, Ratzinger attempted to describe God‟s authorship of Scripture as a 
historically broad yet concrete influence upon both charismatic individuals and the whole People 
of God.  Yet only when this People becomes the Church, the true subject of Christ‟s presence, 
does she realize her full potential as author and interpreter of Scripture. 
 The application of the traditionary model of inspiration to questions of biblical veracity 
leads to a symphonic and Christological model of inerrancy.  Scripture is not inerrant in its 
individual statements, but only as a whole and in the tension of mutually rectifying images, 
perspectives, and dogmatic interpretations.  Ratzinger‟s model of inspiration thus closely 
resembles N. Lohfink‟s critical-correlative model.  Ratzinger goes beyond Lohfink‟s position, 
however, in rooting this interpretive strategy in divinely-bestowed, transhistorical unity of the 
People of God.  Ratzinger‟s hermeneutical theory is consequently not simply a phenomenology 
of the sacred text; it rests upon deeper metaphysical properties of the People of God.  One of 
these metaphysical properties in particular,
314
 the subjectivity and agency of Church, contains 
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important implications for interpretation.  Since the Church, whose faith remains constant 
through change, is even more deeply the “author” or “subject” of Scripture than the individual 
hagiographer, the overriding criterion for determining what Scripture properly intends becomes 
the living substance of the Church‟s faith.  Hence, in order to discover what Scripture inerrantly 
intends, one need only look at what the Church has always believed. 
Of course, it must be admitted that Ratzinger‟s repackaging of inspiration and inerrancy 
is not without its own limitations.  It is clearly couched in the conceptuality of 20
th
 century 
personalism and German Romanticism.  It depends heavily upon ecclesiological premises that 
could scarcely be introduced—let alone defended—in this thesis.  Moreover, in Ratzinger‟s 
model, the uniqueness of Scripture (especially vis-à-vis doctrinal statements and other 
inspirational writings) is more difficult to explain than in Benoit‟s or Rahner‟s model.  As we 
discovered, Ratzinger‟s attempts to describe a qualitative difference between the language of 
God and language about God ultimately devolve into differences of degree, i.e., gradations in the 
intensity of religious experience or in the engagement of religious authority.  
We are now also in a better position to understood where Ratzinger draws the line 
between the abiding “kernel” of the biblical encyclicals and their transient “particulars”.  Within 
the perennial core Ratzinger would locate God‟s unique guidance of the production of Scripture, 
which must itself be understood as inspired in all its parts and inerrant insofar as its author(s) 
intend.  To the periphery Ratzinger would relegate the instrumental model of inspiration, with its 
assumptions of monographic authorship and Thomist rational psychology.  Once the latter 
assumptions are understood to be theologically optional, then certain aspects of the teaching of 
the biblical magisterium on inerrancy—i.e., those dependent on said assumptions—must 
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likewise be understood as optional.  One need no longer defend as “adequate” to reality, at least 
when taken individually, the proposed and intended mental contents of every person who had a 
hand in Scripture‟s composition.  For Ratzinger, these innumerable authorial affirmations 
constitute only tesserae in the larger mosaic of biblical truth, whose pattern is ultimately 
Christological and whose demiurge is the divinely-directed Church.  Ratzinger might agree with 
Abbot Farkasfalvy‟s concise formulation: “By its inspired character each part of the Bible offers 
a path to Christ who is that Truth that God offered mankind for the sake of salvation.”315 
 In its own way, of course, Ratzinger‟s traditionary model of inspiration and inerrancy 
necessarily falls short of the mysterious reality to which it gestures and points.  Nevertheless, 
because it manages to combine into a single model historical plausibility, hermeneutical 
sophistication, metaphysical depth, and doctrinal fidelity, it may well constitute the twentieth 
century‟s least inadequate account of inspiration and inerrancy.  It stands as a solid achievement. 
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